An appeal in the matter of ( CASE NO. amendment application AM3, ) BER 2016-07-SM Signal Peak Energy LLC's ) Bull Mountain Coal Mine \#1 )

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS ORAL ARGUMENT - VIA ZOOM

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BEFORE CHAIRMAN STEVEN RUFFATTO,
BOARD MEMBERS DAVID SIMPSON, JON REITEN, JOSEPH SMITH, JULIA ALTEMUS STACY AGUIRRE, and DAVID LEHNHERR PREPARED BY: LAURIE CRUTCHER, RPR COURT REPORTER, NOTARY PUBLIC lauriecrutcher@gmail.com

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WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were had:

CHAIRMAN RUFFATTO: This is Action Item (a) on Page 6 of the agenda. This is the amended application AM3 for Signal Peak Energy's Bull Mountain Coal Mine No. 1, BER 2016-7. And what we're scheduled to do today is to take up the motion of $D E Q$ to stay this matter pending the appeal of the Western Energy matter to the Montana Supreme Court.

We will hear oral arguments on this today, and decide whether or not we're going to grant the stay. To give the folks that are going to be arguing a heads up, my plan is to give the movant DEQ fifteen minutes, and then I'll give Signal Peak fifteen minutes, and then I'll give MEIC twenty minutes, and probably a little more if they want to respond and to make their points, and then five minutes each for $D E Q$ and Signal Peak.

Now, I have assumed that Signal Peak would want to say something, but they may not. Let's figure out who is going to be speaking for DEQ.

MR. LANGSTON: Good morning, Mr.

Chairman. I'm Jeremiah Langston, and I'll be appearing on behalf of the Department of Environmental Quality.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thank you, Jeremiah.
And is someone appearing on behalf of Signal Peak? MS. BORDELON: Yes, Your Honor, I am. Sarah Bordelon.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Okay. And Mr.
Hernandez, are you appearing on behalf of MEIC?
MR. HERNANDEZ: I am, yes.
CHAIR RUFFATTO: Okay. Do any of you have any questions about the oral argument schedule?

MR. LANGSTON: Mr. Chairman, just to clarify. If $I$ understand you correctly, the Department will be getting fifteen minutes for our opening, and five minutes for a rebuttal; is that correct?

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Correct.
MR. LANGSTON: Thank you.
MR. HERNANDEZ: If I may, may I ask a question?

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Go ahead.
MR. HERNANDEZ: Chairman Ruffatto.
After all sides have presented their arguments,
will there be an open discussion between the Board members, and will Counsel be responding to questions during that discussion?

CHAIR RUFFATTO: I would say yes and yes. My plan would be as soon as oral arguments are over, we will give the Board members a chance to ask any questions, and then we will begin deliberations. And during that process, if you're still here and available, and if a Board member wants to ask somebody a question, that will be appropriate.

MR. HERNANDEZ: Thank you.
CHAIR RUFFATTO: Any other questions or comments?
(No response)
CHAIR RUFFATTO: Okay. I know Mr.
Langston, you are ready, but $I$ don't want to break this up too much, so we're going to take a ten minute break now, and we will reconvene at 10:00 a.m., and we will start oral arguments then. Thank you.

> (Recess taken)

CHAIR RUFFATTO: I'll call the meeting back into order, and the first thing I'd like to do is to ask Sandy or Shawna to call the roll of
the Board to make sure we have a quorum. MS . MOISEY-SCHERER: Chair Ruffatto. ChAIR RUFFATtO: Yes. Here. MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: David Simpson. BOARD MEMBER SIMPSON: You're breaking up. This is Dave. I'm here.

MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: Joe Smith.
BOARD MEMBER SMITH: Here.
MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: Jon Reiten.
BOARD MEMBER REITEN: Here.
MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: Julia Altemus.
BOARD MEMBER ALTEMUS: Here.
MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: David Lehnherr.
BOARD MEMBER LEHNHERR: Here.
MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: Stacy Aguirre.
BOARD MEMBER AGUIRRE: Here.
CHAIR RUFFATTO: You've got a bad echo again now, Shawna.

BOARD MEMBER AGUIRRE: Can you hear me now?

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Yes.
BOARD MEMBER AGUIRRE: All right. I'm here.

MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: Sorry for the echo.
CHAIR RUFFATTO: I think everyone is
here, correct, Shawna?
MS. PIESKE: Yes, sir.
CHAIR RUFFATTO: We have a quorum. So we will proceed with oral arguments on the Signal Peak matter, particularly the DEQ's motion to stay, and $I$ think we're going to start with Mr. Langston.

MR. LANGSTON: Good morning, and may it please the Board, I'm Jeremiah Langston appearing on behalf of the Montana Department of Environmental Quality.

The Board should grant the Department's motion for stay pending an appeal of the District Court's decision on the Rosebud Mine AM4 permit for three reasons.

First, Rule 17.24.425 sub (3) allows the Board to grant such temporary relief, and MEIC is incorrect to argue that this provision is limited to injunctive relief.

Second, the District Court's AM4 decision implicates this case, and MEIC's efforts to distinguish these two cases is without merit.

Third, the balance of potential harm favors granting a stay, because all of the parties and the Board will be harmed if this case proceeds
under an incorrect legal standard.
Before I start my argument, I'd like to inform the Board that $D E Q$ and Westmoreland filed an appeal and a motion to stay the District Court's AM4 decision on February 8, 2022. I believe Westmoreland has already provided the Board notice of this, but $I$ wanted to make sure that this important fact gets conveyed in today's argument.

Turning to my first argument, Rule 17.24.425 sub (3) authorizes the Board to grant a temporary stay pending an appeal of the District Court's AM4 decision to the Montana Supreme Court.

MEIC argues that this rule is limited to injunctive relief, but there's no such limitation in the rule. Instead MEIC advocates the standard applicable to judicial procedural stays. This standard comes from a Court's inherent authority to control its docket. This Board need not rely on such inherent authority because Rule 17.24.425 explicitly allows this Board to grant such relief. But even if the Board were to apply the standard advocated by MEIC applicable to procedural stays in court, a stay is still justified. Two recent Montana Supreme Court cases
which we cited in our reply brief, flying $T$ Ranch and State v. Montana First Judicial District Court, focused on the comparative harm that the parties would endure as a result of a stay.

Because Subsection (3) (c) of Rule 17.24.425 accounts for these comparative harms, and the Department has satisfied this requirement, a stay should be granted under either standard. Moving on to my second argument.

There's considerable overlap between this proceeding and the District Court's decision in AM4. The Department identified three areas of overlap: One, the parties' burden of proof; two, exhaustion of administrative remedies; and three, the Department's ability to explain its permitting decisions on appeal.

MEIC only argues that the burden of proof issue is distinguishable between AM3 and AM4. Because MEIC fails to address these two other issues that overlap, the Board should find that the Department's argument on this point is well taken.

But even MEIC's attempts to distinguish the burden of proof analysis in AM3 and AM4 is without merit. They argue that the burden of
proof is different between these two cases because the relevant issue in $A M 3$ hinges on Subsection (6) (c) of Rule 17.24.405; whereas AM4 hinges on Subsection (6) (a) of the same rule.

This is incorrect for a number of reasons. To begin with, the operative standard in this case comes from Rule 17.24.304(1)(f) (iii), not the provisions cited by MEIC.

Additionally, Rule 17.24.415 Sub(7)
assigns the burden of proof to petitioners challenging all of the Department's MSUMRA decisions before the Board. This rule is equally applicable to AM3 and AM4.

The language within this rule stating that the burden of proof at such hearing is on the party seeking to reverse the decision of the Board is plainly a scrivener's error. This language should instead read, "The burden of proof at such hearing is on the party seeking to reverse the decision of the Department."

This rule was errantly amended in 2012 to reflect a 2005 legislative change that transferred the responsibility for holding a hearing from the Department to the Board. This rulemaking should not have inserted the Board into
subsection (7) of this rule because the Department retained permitting authority, and any hearing before the Board would attempt to reverse the Department's permitting decision, not the Board's permitting decision.

Further, in $A M 3$, the Hearing Examiner cited this Board's AM4 decision in determining the parties' burden of proof. Thus the Hearings Examiner has already identified these issues as being common between those two cases.

Finally, the District Court based its decision on the general provisions in MSUMRA, and did not base its burden of proof decision on the specific subsection that MEIC identifies here. MEIC's exceptions to the Hearing Examiner's proposed FOFCOL in AM3 are a mirror image of the District Court's analysis in AM4.

Accordingly, this Board should view these issues as overlapping between AM3 and AM4, and reject MEIC's efforts to distinguish these two cases.
Turning to my third and final argument, the comparative harms favor granting a stay. If a stay is not granted, all of the parties and the Board will be harmed because we might be advancing
under the incorrect legal standard.
By comparison, MEIC asserts that it has already incurred litigation expenses in this case, and should not be required to incur more through delaying this litigation; but MEIC's argument ignores that this alleged harm will only be exacerbated if we continue this litigation under the incorrect standard and are required to repeat steps at some later date.

Furthermore, MEIC provides the Board no clear guidance on how it should accommodate the District Court's decision. For instance, the Department prepared for trial based on the Hearings Examiner's order on summary judgment with the expectation that MEIC would have the burden of proof.

If the Department and Westmoreland truly have the burden of proof, as the District Court's AM4 decision suggests, the only appropriate remedy is to have another trial under the correct standard. Simply remanding this matter to the Department would not cure this alleged deficiency.

But rather than retrying this case, the far better approach is to get guidance from the Montana Supreme Court on this important issue
before advancing to the next steps in this case.
To conclude, this case reminds me of the Montana Supreme Court's 2010 Whitehall Wind decision, and the pin cite for that is 2010 MT2 Paragraph 18.

In that case, a District Court had found that the Montana Public Service Commission had erred in setting a rate for a small scale renewable energy generator.

The petitioner in that case argued that that case had to be remanded to the Public Service Commission before the Montana Supreme Court could hear the appeal of the District Court's decision. The Montana Supreme Court rejected petitioner's argument, finding that this approach would deprive the PSC of its right to appeal the District Court's decision.

Here, too, the Department has a right to appeal the District Court's decision. In the meantime, the Department should not be subjected to the District Court's procedural rulings that bear directly on this case.

Accordingly, the Board should grant a stay, so that these issues may be resolved before the Montana Supreme Court, and to avoid wasting
time by advancing under incorrect procedure and standards.

And with that, $I$ urge the Board to grant the Department's motion to stay, and am happy to answer any questions that the Board might have.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thank you, Mr.
Langston. I think we'll defer the questions until we have heard arguments from all of the folks.

Now I would ask the attorney for Signal Peak to make her arguments.

MS. BORDELON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Signal Peak supports the Department's motion in this case, and we won't burden your time with repeating those arguments, but will instead provide Signal Peak's perspective on this issue.

Specifically MEIC had noted in its response brief that Signal Peak has repeatedly urged for a prompt resolution in this matter, and we continue to maintain that position. In this case, we think the most expeditious resolution would be to stay it pending the resolution of the AM4 appeal that's currently pending before the Montana Supreme Court.

As Mr. Langston noted, this case was litigated from its inception upon the assumption
that Petitioners as the Plaintiffs in the case bore the burden of proof. Every portion of this case was undertaken under that assumption, which means all of the strategic decisions that Signal Peak made throughout discovery, and hearing, and summary judgment, were based on that assumption.

As Mr. Langston noted, if as Petitioners appear to urge we were to adopt the District Court's burden of proof, the only way to resolve this case without undo prejudice to Signal Peak's rights would be to reinitiate the case.

That would cause enormous cost and time obviously, when delay for a few months -hopefully -- as the Supreme Court moves forward on Westmoreland's appeal will provide clarity to the Board on multiple fundamental procedure questions that arose in that case.

To speak a little bit more about the question of what it means for Petitioners to have the burden of proof versus the Defendants, the Petitioners determined the scope of the case with their notice of appeal, so all of the information that was presented and elicited during discovery went to the questions and issues they raised in their notice of appeal.

They went first in the hearing, presented their affirmative case. Signal Peak created a litigation strategy based on defeating their affirmative case, not presenting an independent affirmative case.

Had Signal Peak known that it was going to bear the burden of proof, we would have presented different information, additional information, potentially different witnesses. To move forward at this advanced point without that opportunity would create significant problems.

Specifically, if this case now being poised for the Board's decision -- all of the post-hearing briefing being completed -- if the Board were to issue a decision, likely one party would then seek judicial review.

That judicial review would go forward under potentially a question about what the appropriate legal standard is, and regardless of what the Supreme Court does, would likely result in motion practice at the District Court to send it back to the Board probably. Undoing all of this work would create substantial work for all of the parties that could be avoided with this stay. One final point is the scope of the
evidence. In the AM4 case there's a question of how much, how broadly the evidence can be collected beyond the terms of the actual permit application.

MEIC has maintained that it should be confined to the four corners of the permit application and the CHIA.

Signal Peak in motions practice in this case attempted to present post-decisional evidence regarding the accuracy of $D E Q$ 's predictions of impacts in this case. That information was excluded from the hearing, but the question of whether that was post-decisional or extra-record evidence, as MEIC calls it, is appropriate under MAPA, which provides all parties the right to present and respond to evidence, will be before the Supreme Court in the AM4 appeal.

So it is possible that we will receive an order from the Supreme Court that will instruct that parties like Signal Peak should have the opportunity to present that extra-record evidence, and Signal Peak may wish to present that in this case if that occurs.

So these are complicated procedural issues, and we have struggled with them
internally. We are happy to provide the Board and respond to any questions about how this may work, but in the interests of time, we'll leave it at that.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thank you. We'll move to Mr. Hernandez.

MR. HERNANDEZ: Thank you, Chairman
Ruffatto, members of the Board. Shiloh Hernandez with EarthJustice. I represent Petitioner, Montana Environmental Information Center.

Here to stay this proceeding pending resolution by the Supreme Court of the Rosebud case would constitute an abuse of discretion. I'd like to cover three points this morning, and then respond to a few items that Ms. Bordelon and Mr. Langston addressed.

First, Ms. Bordelon was right when she said five years is too much. This case has been pending too long and needs resolution. If anything, the District Court's decision in the Rosebud case has made the Board's job easier by clarifying the correct burden of proof applicable in this case.

Second, DEQ's contention that it's entitled to a stay based on ARM 17.24.425(3) is
plainly wrong, as the plain text of that provision indicates.

Third, DEQ has failed to demonstrate, as it must, that its request for the extraordinary remedy of a stay is necessary to avoid a clear case of hardship or inequity.

To my first point. As I mentioned, Signal Peak had it right the first time when they said five years is too much. This case has been pending since 2016 with no resolution. Finally, it's teed up for a merits decision from the Board. That's the Board's only obligation with respect to this case: Review the briefs and issue a decision.

By law -- and this is ARM 17.24.425-this hearing is supposed to be conducted within 30 days of the appeal. This is approximately 50 times longer than expected. It's supposed to be an expeditious process. Five years is simply too long. And the reason this is the problem is because the case simply becomes more difficult to resolve with the passage of time.

We see the personnel for both $D E Q$, the parties, and the Board has shifted numerous times over the case of this litigation, the evidence grows stale, the hearing fades in everyone's memory, and all the while the mining operation in the Bull Mountains continues, causing harm to MEIC's members, and the people who ranch above the mining operation.

As the Federal District Court of Colorado said, and we cite this in our brief, in the Glasser decision, a stay of the proceedings only makes the tribunal's management of its docket more difficult, because it injects uncertainty and unpredictability into the Court's docket.

Here we don't know if this case is stayed indefinitely, we don't know who is going to be the Hearing Examiner when the Supreme Court case is finally resolved, we don't know who's going to be on the Board, we don't even know who Counsel for the parties are going to be.

And we see this with DEQ. DEQ's Counsel has shuffled time and again over the course of this case, and each time they get a new attorney, they ask for additional stay.

And here, we see where DEQ lost their prior attorney, Ms. Christopherson; and then Mr. Lucas left; and when DEQ's attorneys changed, they requested more time for filing briefs, months of
time. And during that time, new events unfold -the AM4 decision, the Rosebud decision -- which prompted DEQ to seek further delay and extension.

You can see how this leads to
compounding problems by continuing to push off a resolution of this case.

And to the second point. With respect to the provision DEQ cited as justification for its stay, ARM 17.24.415(3), I urge the Board and the Board members to review this provision because it simply isn't applicable to stays of a proceeding pending a resolution of a separate proceeding.

You see this in the terms that it addresses. For example, 425(3), one of the provisions under this is a demonstration of success on the merits. Why would analysis of likely success on the merits be relevant for a stay pending appeal of another case? You don't see that in any case law addressing stays in these circumstances.

Even if it were applicable, DEQ's whole argument is that the Rosebud decision undermines its case here. So even if 17.24.425(3) were applicable, DEQ couldn't satisfy the standard
because under the existing case law -- which is the Rosebud case -- DEQ loses.

And DEQ went as far as effectively admitted this by saying their entire theory of their case loses if the Court's decision in the Rosebud case applies.

But as I mentioned, the Board doesn't have to go there because 425(3) simply isn't applicable. It establishes temporary relief, and I quote, "pending final determination of the proceedings." So the purpose of 425(3) is to allow relief, which would be on the ground injunctive type relief, pending resolution of the decision.

So it's understood by the operation of the provision that the matter will move forward towards resolution, while temporary relief is in place. That's not applicable if the whole proceeding is put on ice for a stay.

And then $I$ think the Board should also look at 425 Subsection (2), which says that a hearing is supposed to commence within 30 days of an appeal.

Now, DEQ's contention that they can indefinitely stay this case under 425(3), it
doesn't work with that 30 day period, because what DEQ is effectively saying is that that provision should say that a hearing should commence within 30 days unless the Board grants an indefinite stay. Now, that's DEQ just reading new language into the provision.

As we explain in our brief, the applicable standard for a stay of one case pending resolution of another case was set forth long ago by the United Supreme Court in the Landis decision, and adopted by the Montana Supreme Court in the Henry decision, and applied in a number of cases since then.

Now, Mr. Langston was more or less right that this analysis is pretty much just a balancing test, considering the hardship to different parties. The problem for $D E Q$, though, is that no case that any party has cited has approved a stay of one case pending an appeal of another case. We've cited numerous cases where Courts have held that it's been an abuse of discretion for a tribunal to stay one case pending resolution of another case.

The case that most clearly addresses this is the original case, the Landis decision,
written by the United States Supreme Court in 1936. I urge all of the members of the Board to review that case. It was written by Justice Cardozo, one of the best writers of the Court, in the history of the Court, and the analysis was quite clear.

The Court said that there were two cases that were operating on parallel tracks that involved a similar question, and the Court in the second case imposed a stay pending resolution of the first.

The Court ultimately said that the stay made sense through resolution of the first case at the District Court, but staying it longer than that fails for two reasons.

The first is that the District Court's decision provides sufficient certainty as to what the law should be. That's what we have here. The Rosebud case provides the certainty that DEQ wants, that the Board needs with respect to the burden of proof.

The second point the Supreme Court made in the Landis decision was that to stay a proceeding longer than just resolution at the District Court was indefinite, immoderate, and
abuse of discretion here, and that's the case here.

Neither Mr. Langston, nor Ms. Bordelon, has given us any idea how long it will take the Montana Supreme Court to resolve the Rosebud appeal. There's motions practice right now. There are motions before the Board saying that the appeal was not properly raised. There are matters pending resolution at the District Court still.

There's no clarity about when this matter will be resolved, and to put this case on ice pending resolution of the Rosebud case in the Montana Supreme Court would be an abuse of discretion.

Now, the Board can review DEQ's filing in this case. They have not cited one decision where any tribunal has approved an indefinite stay pending the appeal of another case. There's not one decision that's said that. By contrast, numerous Courts have said it's simply an abuse of discretion to deny a party resolution of its case pending the appeal of another case.

The important part of this is an analysis of the competing hardships. On the one hand here, we have this case which has moved
forward for five years, going on six, with no resolution. By any measure that's an extraordinary period of time, as Signal Peak itself said at length to this Board just this summer.

Now, consider the harm that DEQ has offered. DEQ has hypothesized allowing this case to go forward prior to a resolution of the Rosebud case by the Montana Supreme Court may result in harm to DEQ.

But what harm has DEQ identified? It's not at all clear. In their brief, in their opening brief, the only thing DEQ identified as far as harm to the agency -- and this is at Page 5 of their brief -- they cite potential uncertainty. Potential uncertainty. That's not harm. It is not at all clear how that is harm.

And if anything, the Rosebud decision has dispelled uncertainty because the 16 th Judicial District Court in a very detailed opinion explained the operation of the burden of proof in an MSUMRA case.

Now, the second thing that DEQ has offered by way of potential harm is their prognostication in their reply brief about a
potential new trial. Now, this is at best speculation. How would a new trial work here?

There are a few possibilities. Now, if the Board moves forward on the basis of the existing law, DEQ should lose. Signal Peak should lose. The Board should reverse DEQ's permitting decision.

Now, if the Board does that, then DEQ and Signal Peak can exercise their ability to appeal, just as Ms. Bordelon mentioned. They would bring this matter to the District Court. There they can raise their arguments about appropriate burden of proof, and if they lose there, they can appeal to the Montana Supreme Court.

By that time there's no question that there will be a resolution of the Rosebud case, and the burden of proof will be clarified. There's no chance that this matter is going to go back to a new trial at some point in time before the Supreme Court resolved the Rosebud case. It just wouldn't happen.

Now, Ms. Bordelon talked about potential motions practice in an appeal, and it's not at all clear what that was a reference to. Yes, a Board
decision in this case will be appealed to the District Court, and the parties will brief the law and facts, and the Court will resolve it one way or another, depending on what the law is, either the District Court in Rosebud got it right or it didn't.

But either way it will be resolved at District Court. This isn't going back to a trial, and resolution of this case won't lead to any more briefing than it otherwise would. There will be merit briefing at a District Court and then an appeal.

Now, there may be something that I've missed here, some allegation of additional harm to DEQ, but $I$ haven't seen it. And their obligation merely to go forward and defend this case isn't cognizable harm. We point that out in our brief. Numerous cases say just having to litigate a case isn't harm. That's what DEQ has to do. They issued this decision, this permit. If they think they did it right, then they have to defend it.

In sum, this case has been pending now for over five years. It's teed up for resolution on the merits, and that's what the Board should do, move forward with resolution. All that
remains is a hearing, discuss the merits, and issuance of an order.

DEQ's motion for a stay rests on inapplicable grounds, and even if $D E Q$ had addressed the actual standards set forth in the Landis decision, it wouldn't meet the applicable standard. Therefore, DEQ's motion for a stay, an indefinite stay would be immoderate, and an abuse of discretion, and should be denied. Thank you. I'm happy to answer any questions after the rebuttal arguments of Signal Peak and DEQ.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thank you, Mr.
Hernandez. And now we'll move to rebuttal, and Mr. Langston, if you would be up first, please. MR. LANGSTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd first like to address Mr. Hernandez's argument that if the District Court's AM4 decision is adopted here, then DEQ loses.

I'd like to note that in our opening brief requesting a stay, the DEQ reserved the position that even if we were subject to the burden of proof in this case, that we would nevertheless have satisfied our obligations, and the Department's permit decision should be upheld. So I disagree with Mr. Hernandez's position on

> that.

Furthermore, Mr. Hernandez took the perspective that the District Court's AM4 decision clarified law.

I think it's notable that the District Court's AM4 decision departed from the Montana Supreme Court's well-established precedent in MEIC-2 concerning the Clean Air Act that said that the party seeking to overturn the Department's permitting decision bears the burden of proof.

So there is a lot going on in this case, but to be sure, this District Court's decision is in tension with Montana Supreme Court precedent. We believe that they departed from this precedent without adequately explaining its reasons for doing so, and accordingly $I$ don't think that it's entirely correct to say that the District Court resolved all these issues, and we don't need to consider what future appellate decision making might be made in AM4.

Mr. Hernandez's first argument was a riff on the mine's position that in the summer that five years had been too much delay in this case. But $I$ would argue that our waiting several months to get resolution from the Montana Supreme

Court on these important issues is far better than advancing under the wrong standard. And if we advance under the standard, and make a decision, the delays that could result from having to have an appeal to a District Court, and have it remanded back, or remanding this case by the Board back to the Trial Court could potentially be -- excuse me -- to a trial posture would result in much longer delays.

It is far better to wait a few months for guidance from the Montana Supreme Court, rather than go off into uncertainty, and not know what future procedures this case might be subjected to.

I just think it's notable, too, that Mr. Hernandez complained about transitions between attorneys in this case. I think it's notable that when we filed this reply in our motion to stay this case, we didn't ask for any extensions. We filed it in a timely fashion. So there's no indication that at least current Counsel isn't going to meet all deadlines and advance in this case expeditiously.

MEIC has argued that the rule cited by the Department as providing the basis for a stay
here is inapplicable, and they point to the analysis on the merits in that rule, and the requirement that the party asking for relief has to show a certain likelihood of success.

I think it's notable that this relief is rather broad. It's not limited to injunctive relief. It allows the Board to grant all sorts of relief, and accordingly you would expect that the inquiries that the Board might look to would similarly be broad.

But even if we were to focus on the merits, the Department already has a favorable decision from the Hearings Examiner in this case. It's MEIC who is filing exceptions to the Hearing Examiner's order, not the Department, so we've already demonstrated a certain likelihood of success in the merits on this case.

Mr. Hernandez asserted that by arguing that these cases overlap between $A M 3$ and AM4, we have conceded our central theory of this case. This is wrong by MEIC's own concession.

They're the ones who have argued here that the applicable standards are different between AM4 and AM3, so they've already done the distinguishing on the merits in this case to make
the point that we just don't automatically lose if we view AM4 as having bearing on this case.

So to the extent that they do have bearing, that that case has bearing on this case, it's from a procedural standpoint. It's the procedural process that occurs under MSUMRA, and that is how these cases overlap in process, not in substance.

Mr. Hernandez argued that we needed to initiate this case and have a hearing after 30 days. This 30 day limitation is limited to initiating the contested case proceeding. It does not bear on the Court -- or excuse me -- the Board accepting the proposed findings of fact. There's no such limitation or time constrictions on the Board in this process.

So the contested case has already been initiated, the Board has already satisfied that requirement, and referring back to that time requirement is inapplicable to the current posture of this case.

And I see with that I've exceeded my five minutes. I appreciate you indulging me in me taking an extra minute. I'm happy to answer any questions that Board members may have, but at this
point I'll end my rebuttal.
CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thank you, Mr.
Langston. Ms. Bordelon. Thank you.
MS. BORDELON: Thank you. It's a Cajun name. I inherited it when I married my husband, so I have to explain it every time.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thank you.
MS. BORDELON: I'd like to echo Mr.
Langston's argument about the validity of this permit, and the fact that the Hearing Examiner has issued a proposed decision dismissing -- or advising the rejection of MEIC's claims here.

And in particular, in that decision, the Hearing Examiner issued a -- proposes a conclusion of law that MEIC did not challenge, which stated that, "Signal Peak affirmatively demonstrated that there are water supplies that could be developed to replace water supplies diminished or otherwise adversely impacted as contemplated under the law." She supported this with 85 discrete findings of fact, most of which were also not challenged by MEIC.

So like DEQ, we would oppose and strongly reject MEIC's contention that they automatically win because of AM4, because the
proposed decision in this case -- which they have not challenged -- held that Signal Peak did meet its affirmative burden in this case.

Notwithstanding, we also strongly dispute the claim from Mr. Hernandez that there would be no hearing. It simply is a clear prejudicial error for the Board to move forward under a different burden of proof at the end of the proceedings than was litigated under in the beginning.

Yes, we could appeal, and clear prejudice in the procedure is a basis for appeal of an MSUMRA decision, but we think the Board would be better advised, if it wished to proceed, to reinitiate the case under the standard if it wishes to adopt the AM4 standard.

That would avoid the necessity of further appeal in which the Board would almost certainly be reversed because of the clear prejudicial error of forcing parties to move forward under a changed burden of proof at the eleventh hour.

While MEIC does not wish to have a hearing, would like to assert by fiat that it wins this case by virtue of AM4, which they also argue
is distinguishable in a difficult to understand argument, that simply is not the case.

The Board here is presented with a difficult position, that the case was litigated under one standard, a standard that's established by Montana Supreme Court law -- which the Board had adopted and considered deeply in the AM4 decision -- and then the District Court in the AM4 decision changed that, grappling with some of the Supreme Court precedent, but obviously the District Court does not have the authority to overturn the Supreme Court precedent, which as Mr. Langston said, puts the Board in a difficult position of having conflicting authorities.

In this point we think that the most expeditious process that would preserve party and Board resources would be simply to wait, and look to the Supreme Court to resolve this question. The question is teed up before the Supreme Court now, and we believe that the Board should grant DEQ's motion to stay pending that certainty. Thank you.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thank you. I would at this point like to thank all of you for your excellent arguments, and $I$ think you've done a good job of grappling with a lot of unknowns and conflicting lines of thought. So thank you for that. I'd like open it up. Mr. Hernandez.

MR. HERNANDEZ: Chairman Ruffatto, may I have one minute to address one point that Ms. Bordelon and Mr. Langston addressed that $I$ think would be helpful to the Board, and shouldn't take up more than one minute of your time?

CHAIR RUFFATTO: You may.
MR. HERNANDEZ: Now, there was some discussion of the expectations of Signal Peak Energy and DEQ at the outset of this hearing about the burden of proof.

Now, I think they had clear evidence from the Board about the appropriate burden of proof in the Board's decision in the prior iteration of this case. This is the In Re: Bull Mountain Mine decision that the Board issued in 2016 .

And there $I$ would just direct the Board to Pages 86 and 87 of the Board's decision, where the Board said that DEQ and Signal Peak lost that case because they did not affirmatively demonstrate that their mining operation would not cause harm to water resources.

So there the Board applied a burden of proof that held DEQ and the mining operators to the standard that the District Court held in the Rosebud case. They had the burden of proof. They should not act surprised that the burden of proof rests with them. That's what this Board said in its prior decision in this case.

And that's the In Re: Bull Mountain Mine decision from 2016 at Pages 86 and 87. I think that the Board needs to consider that information in resolving this matter. Thank you, Chairman Ruffatto. I appreciate the indulgence.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Of course. I'm not familiar with what Mr. Hernandez referred to. If either Signal Peak or DEQ have a response to that, I'll give you a minute if you want.

MR. LANGSTON: Mr. Chairman, if $I$ might briefly just address that very quickly.

The precedent for determining which party had the burden of proof was established in AM4, and it was looking back to these prior MSUMRA cases, including Bull Mountain.

Now, if $I$ understand Mr. Hernandez correctly, this language about the Department adequately explaining its decision making, $I$ mean
that's a well established principle in administrative law that you have to adequately explain your decision making, and if you don't do so, then the agency's decision can be overturned. And from the sounds of it, that's what his comment is getting at, that there the Department did not adequately explain why it granted the permit. And you see that all over in administrative law.

Now, that's different than the burden of proof. I mean a burden of proof is ultimately what you have to prove, and here it would be the Petitioner proving that the Department inadequately explained its decision making. They would have the burden of proof. But nevertheless, the Department still has to explain its decision making.

So it's important to fine slice these issues, and $I$ think there's a lot of confusion all over the place, both in AM4 and AM3, as to who has to explain what, and what time; but once you start to bear down on it, it becomes exceptionally clear that normal administrative law principles give them the burden of proof.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thank you, Mr. Langston.

MS. BORDELON: Mr. Chairman, may I add one short point?

CHAIR RUFFATTO: If it's short. We're getting really down in the weeds here.

MS. BORDELON: Yes. The case that Mr. Hernandez referred was a separate case. It was resolved, and in the Board's order resolving it, it said that any future appeal would be a new case. The case we're dealing now is separate, so there's no question that a law of the case principle could apply here.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thank you. All right. At this point, $I$ would like to ask the Board members if you have any questions at this point. And this won't be your last chance to ask questions, but if any of you have questions immediately, we can present them to these advocates.

BOARD MEMBER SIMPSON: Mr. Chairman, this is Dave Simpson.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Go ahead.
BOARD MEMBER SIMPSON: Just to make sure. Okay. I have a question. I'm not even sure who to direct it to.

But if $I$ understand correctly the situation here, this case, Signal Peak, has proceeded under existing law and precedent established by the Montana Supreme Court regarding burden of proof. We have a conflicting District Court decision in another district.

So the two questions $I$ have are, first of all, since the decision is in a different district, is it applicable to Signal Peak?

Second is since we are operating under established law and precedent so far in this case, does this District Court decision affect our process at this point, the Supreme Court not having yet heard it?

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Let's direct that question to all three, because $I$ think it's critical. It goes to the question of whether or not the AM4 decision is binding on this Board, which $I$ think is hugely significant. So if we would -- I'd like to give each of the advocates one minute to address that. Mr. Hernandez, go ahead.

MR. HERNANDEZ: Chair Ruffatto, whatever order you wish.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: You go ahead, Mr.

Hernandez.
MR. HERNANDEZ: To the first point: Is the District Court's decision binding on the Board?

The District Court reversed the Board. The Board is not at liberty to ignore the District Court decision. That's what happened. Now, it was a different case, but it would seem to usurp the Court's role of judicial review, the Board simply to ignore a decision of a State District Court that reversed the Board. But $I$ think that it would be a very risky endeavor for the Board to follow, to simply ignore the AM4 decision.

And the second question, Member Simpson, is with respect to existing case law. Now, the Board has been provided with a copy of the District Court's decision, $I$ presume, and there is this question about this 2005 MEIC versus DEQ decision under the Clean Air Act that Mr. Langston cited.

The District Court distinguished that case in the AM4 litigation of the Rosebud case on the basis of a number of authorities. First was the law at issue here, the strip mining law, the Montana Strip and Underground Mine Reclamation

Act, which expressly places the burden on the applicant, and the regulations place the burden on the applicant and DEQ. The Board noted that the Clean Air Act in its statutory text doesn't do that, and that's critical.

The second authority that the District Court relied on in the Rosebud case was existing Montana Supreme Court case law about the Montana Water Use Act, which says in this type of case where you have the burden of proof on the applicant to show that certain environmental harm will not occur, that burden remains on the applicant in an appeal of a decision.

And the reason for that is that if no one presents any evidence in an appeal, then the Applicant won't have met its burden. If there's no evidence, if Signal Peak presents zero evidence that they're not going to cause harm to water resources, then they're not entitled to a permit. That doesn't change in an appeal.

Now, that's the authority that the District Court found binding, and found in the Montana Environmental Information Center case wasn't applicable. To the degree that the MEIC case from 2005 was applicable, the District Court
noted that when it analyzed a provision in the Clean Water Act roughly analogous to the provision at issue here, under MSUMRA, the Montana Supreme Court in that case, the MEIC case, said that the burden of establishing that certain environmental harm will not occur rested with the applicant. And there it was an applicant for a coal plant near Signal Peak.

So the question of whether or not there is binding Supreme Court authority about the applicable burden of proof in an MSUMRA case, here the answer is no. And there are a number of other authorities on different issues that are relevant that the District Court analyzed and concluded demonstrates that the burden of proof here is with DEQ and the mine applicant, which in this case would be Signal Peak.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thank you, Mr.
Hernandez. Mr. Langston.
MR. LANGSTON: Mr. Chairman, and Board Member Simpson.

I think this question gets at the crux of the issue before today, before the Board today. It is the Department's position that the District Court's decision, because it is an out of district
decision, is not binding on Signal Peak. It's a well-established principle, and accordingly the Board could disregard that decision.

However, $I$ understand that ignoring a
Court decision is an awkward position to be in. I wouldn't want to be in your shoes. And the better solution to avoid that awkwardness is to grant the stay, and allow the Montana Supreme Court to opine on this issue. It's not going to take years. We've already filed the appeal. It's going to move forward at an expeditious pace.

And accordingly, the Board should grant a stay, even if the District Court's decision isn't binding on this proceeding.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thank you, Mr.
Langston. Ms. Bordelon.
MS. BORDELON: Thank you. I would echo Mr. Langston's position regarding the decision not being binding. Agency non-acquiescence is a well-established principle in Federal law that where a decision is issued in one district, it's not binding in another.

And as to the AM4 decision affecting settled law, $I$ would first note that the decision signed by the District Court in that case was a
nearly verbatim adoption of MEIC's proposed decision. So when MEIC is telling you that the District Court did this analysis, what they're really saying is they did this analysis which was signed by the District Court.

That analysis is replete with errors,
including fundamental misstatements of cases. One example is the Bostwick case. This is the case that Mr. Hernandez cites for the proposition that the applicant carries the burden of proof throughout the process, because if the Applicant doesn't present proof at the hearing challenging the permit, then the applicant would automatically lose.

That is a misunderstanding of Bostwick fundamentally. In that case the applicant had applied for a permit which was denied. The applicant then appealed from that denial, and because the applicant was challenging the agency decision, the applicant carried the burden of proof.

In the original MEIC v. DEQ case, the air quality case, there MEIC was challenging the decision to grant the permit, so it carried the burden of proof.

We are in the exact same position here. Because MEIC has challenged the decision to grant a permit, so it carries the burden of proof. The distinction between the Clean Air Act and MSUMRA is unavailing. The Clean Air Act in its permitting regulations includes almost identical language to the MSUMRA statutory language about the affirmative obligation for the applicant to demonstrate that it qualifies for the permit.

That is not a burden of proof, that is not the type of instruction that the Supreme Court was looking at in MEIC $v$. DEQ when it discussed whether there was a statutory instruction in terms of burden of proof. Thank you.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thank you. I think at this point we will take a short break. We will reconvene at 11:05, and then we'll proceed with questions, and Board Members, please prepare your questions so that we can put them forward. I know Dr. Lehnherr has a question. And I think questions are going to be appropriate. It's a very complex situation. Thank you. We'll reconvene at 11:05.

> (Recess taken)

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Let's reconvene, and

Sandy, can you call roll again.
MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: Chair Ruffatto.
CHAIR RUFFATTO: Here.
MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: Mr. Lehnherr.
BOARD MEMBER LEHNHERR: Here.
MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: Mr. Simpson.
BOARD MEMBER SIMPSON: Here.
MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: Mr. Smith.
BOARD MEMBER SMITH: Here.
MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: Mr. Reiten.
BOARD MEMBER REITEN: I'm here.
MS . MOISEY-SCHERER: Ms. Altemus.
BOARD MEMBER ALTEMUS: Here. Thank you.
MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: Ms. Aguirre.
BOARD MEMBER AGUIRRE: Here.
MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: We have a quorum.
CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thank you, Sandy. So let's proceed with any questions that the Board has for the parties. Dr. Lehnherr. Go ahead.

BOARD MEMBER LEHNHERR: Thank you, Chairman Ruffatto. There are just a couple points I was hoping to get some additional information on.

I have some documents from January of this year that say that an appeal in the Rosebud
case has yet to be filed. I want know if that's still the case.

The second part of my questioning has to deal with: Once an appeal is filed, is there any idea how long it would take before that appeal went before the Supreme Court? Thank you.

ChAIR RUFFATtO: Mr. Hernandez, do you want to try that?

MR. HERNANDEZ: Yes, sure. Chair
Ruffatto, Board Member Lehnherr.
The appeal has been filed, an appeal has been filed in the Rosebud case, two, in fact three appeals have been filed. That's very emphatic. But they've been filed under different theories, and there's a question before the Supreme Court right now about whether or not they are properly filed, pending resolution of other matters that remain before the District Court.

And if you give me a second, I'll explain that, and then I'll jump to your second question about how long you can expect it to take the Supreme Court to resolve all these matters.

So both DEQ and Westmoreland in the
Rosebud case filed what are called interlocutory appeals, which are appeals before entry of a final
judgment in the case, because there has been no final entry of judgment yet. Interlocutory appeals are allowed under, among other theories, for appeals of an injunction.

Now, the District Court didn't in fact issue an injunction in the Rosebud case, but Westmoreland for its position, and DEQ for their position, they argue that the District Court's decision was vacatur, was the equivalent of an injunction more or less; and the Plaintiffs, the Petitioners in that case, opposed that and challenged it. There is, for what it's worth, Federal case law saying that vacatur isn't the same as an injunction.

Now, Westmoreland also raised another interlocutory appeal about being forced to surrender a property right or property. That also is subject to challenge, because there's statements from the Federal regulatory authority under the federal strip mining law that a strip mining permit or a coal mining permit is not in fact a property right.

So there's a cloud over those interlocutory appeals. And the petitioners, appellees, the conservation groups in that case,
have said that the appeals are premature.
Now, there was a second appeal filed by Westmoreland in that case, arguing that -- for appeal of the whole case, rather than just a remedy. And there, Westmoreland, the mining company, admitted that the prerequisite for an appeal wasn't met, and that's a final judgment.

And just a bit of background. The Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure require a final judgment before an appeal can take place under normal circumstances. Final judgment is a term of art, and in Montana that necessitates a resolution of attorney fees. There is an outstanding motion for attorneys fees before the District Court that is working its way towards resolution.

The mining company has sought to appeal, suspend the Rules of Appellate Procedure, to allow their appeal to go forward. That motion is now pending before the Montana Supreme Court, and it has been opposed by conservation groups.

So at this stage, the appeal, the multiple appeals that have been filed in the Rosebud case, are operating under a cloud of uncertainty, and it's not clear that they will be
-- the appeals will even be able to move forward. Which leads to the second question, which is: How long can we expect it to take an appeal at the Montana Supreme Court? And I don't think there's a lot of clarity on that.

The Montana Supreme Court prides itself,
I think, on trying to move appeals forward on average at a faster clip. And $I$ think they say roughly 180 days from when an appeal is submitted, which means when all of the briefing is done.

That, however, can take quite some time, and that average is often based on the court's summary disposition of lot of appeals that don't have much meat to them, so the court disposes of a lot of appeals by way of what they call unpublished opinions, which are just short two page rulings.

For a case like this, where you have what will be six merits arguments, and then a host of remedies arguments, that really raise issues of first impression. I think that at least from my perspective, it's far from certain that this matter will be able to be resolved within a year, let alone the matter of months that Mr. Langston and Ms. Bordelon have posited, because in this
case $I$ think there's a decent likelihood that there will be oral argument, which takes additional time.

So $I$ think that as a general rule, the Montana Supreme Court tries to resolve cases quickly, but $I$ don't think this case lends itself to a simple resolution.

And for what it's worth, there's a little bit of prognostication here and reading tea leaves. The data points that we do have that are solid is that the Montana Supreme Court generally tries to resolve cases after submission within 180 days, but submission itself can take months because that's the time it takes all parties to write their briefs.

So that's -- and like $I$ said, I think this case is an exception. It's not going to be a case that's resolved quickly, given, as we've all discussed, the complexities involved.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thank you, Mr.
Hernandez. Ms. Bordelon, can you offer your views.

MS. BORDELON: Yes. And I also am involved in the Westmoreland appeal, so can provide some clarity on Mr. Hernandez's statements
there.
The first point $I$ would like to make is that the District Court has -- again adopting MEIC's proposed order -- issued what it called a deferred vacatur, which will vacate the AM4 permit on April 1st.

At that point the mine will be prohibited from mining in the AM4 area, which will have prompt ramifications for the power that is generated at the Colstrip power plant. Because of those severe consequences, Westmoreland and other parties are seeking to expedite this appeal in multiple fashion.

So Mr. Hernandez's suggestion that this won't be resolved quickly $I$ think fails to take into account the very significant public interest concerned with this appeal because of its serious public interest impacts in terms of electrical rates, and the possibility of brown-outs and black-outs as a result of the District Court's decision. We are working expeditiously to get the Supreme Court to act on this.

And in terms of Mr. Hernandez's question about whether this decision represents an injunction based on Federal law, obviously the

Montana Supreme Court will make that decision, if and when MEIC actually files a motion to dismiss, which they have not done at this point.

However, what they should do when they do that is look to Montana law, and the definition of injunction under Montana law, which looks to the effect of the Court's order, regardless of what it calls it, and in this case the Court -- I don't think MEIC would contest -- the Court has, is preventing, or will prevent as of April 1 Westmoreland from conducting previous lawful mining activities.

We don't necessarily contest Mr. Hernandez's estimates of the Supreme Court's procedures in general.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thank you. I take it that that answers your question, Doctor?

BOARD MEMBER LEHNHERR: Yes. There's a lot of --

CHAIR RUFFATTO: It is an answer, yes.
Any more questions?
BOARD MEMBER REITEN: I guess I've got one, and probably opens me up to my ignorance of the legal issues. But if a stay is not approved, what would happen next?

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Actually $I$ 'm going to give one of the proponents of the motion the first opportunity to respond to that, and that actually was a question that $I$ was going to ask if no one else did, and that is:

Please outline how you think it would -how the Board should proceed if the stay is not granted. If the stay is not granted. And I think that will be instructive, and $I$ think that's what you're asking, Jon, right?

BOARD MEMBER REITEN: Yes. Correct.
CHAIR RUFFATTO: Mr. Langston, can you start with that question.

MR. LANGSTON: Mr. Chairman, yes. So if a stay is not granted, then the Board would be in a position of considering whether to adopt the Hearing Examiner's proposed findings of fact and conclusion of law.

As the Board members probably remember, today was slated to be the day that we would have oral argument on that matter, and the exceptions that MEIC filed on the proposed findings of fact and conclusion of law.

So the next immediate procedural step would be to have an oral argument on what amounts
to the merits of this case, and whether or not this Board should adopt the proposed findings of fact and conclusion of law.

Now, there's additional paths that the Board would have to go down if it were in that posture, and namely it would have to consider whether or not it views the District Court's decision as binding on the Board.

As we argued earlier, we do not think it is, but if you were to find that the District Court's decision was binding, well, then that would invalidate some of the Hearing Examiner's previous decisions on who bears the burden of proof.

So there's two things you could do with that. You could say, "Well, we don't think that the Department made the correct decision, but they weren't given the appropriate opportunity to carry their burden of proof, so we have to remand this back to a trial posture, and retry the case."

Alternatively, you could say, "Even though the Department wasn't in the position of believing it had the burden of proof, it nevertheless satisfied its obligation, the permit was properly issued," and adopt the proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law with modifications as you see necessary.

But I do not believe that the proposed outcome that $I$ think MEIC thinks is appropriate, in which you reverse the permit, and don't remand this case back to a trial posture, is appropriate because that would, as the Westmoreland's Counsel has pointed out, would substantially prejudice our rights in this proceeding.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thank you, Mr.
Langston. Sarah.
MS. BORDELON: Yes. I think Mr.
Langston had a great summary of the process here. I just wanted to point out that if the Board determines that it does need to modify or reject any of the proposed findings of fact, it can do so only after a review of the full record under 2-4-621, MCA.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thank you. Mr.
Hernandez.
MR. HERNANDEZ: I think Mr. Langston had it right. If the Board doesn't grant a stay, then what it does procedurally is sets this matter for oral argument, probably at the next Board meeting, which would be three months.

During that time the Board members would have the opportunity to review the proposed findings of then Hearing Examiner Buzzas, and the exceptions filed by all parties, hear oral argument then at the next Board meeting, and then issue a decision after that oral argument, which could happen quickly.

One question about the remedy that the Board could issue. The Board would have the opportunity to either issue a remedy right away, or ask the party to discuss remedy.

The proposal by DEQ and Signal Peak that the Board would have to remand for a new trial if they found that $D E Q$ and $S i g n a l$ Peak were simply wrong as a matter of law with their conception of the burden of proof at the outset is just wrong. They're wrong on that.

If they made a mistake of law that they adhere to across the state, the fact that they're found to be mistaken doesn't give them a chance for a redo. It means they go back and they do a new permit.

Now, consider for a second if the shoe were on the other foot. In this case, Petitioner Montana Environmental Information Center, based on
the Board's prior decision in the Bull Mountain case -- which was the decision before this one -operated under the assumption that $D E Q$ and Signal Peak bore the burden of proof.

Now, if the Board determines that MEIC was wrong with that, and we in fact bore the burden of proof, would the remedy be to go back and have another trial with MEIC bearing the burden of proof, even though we didn't think we had to?

I would submit that neither Ms. Bordelon nor Mr. Langston would say that in that case it would be prejudicial to Petitioner MEIC to have an adverse ruling, based on MEIC's hypothetically mistaken conception of the burden of proof. It's not just the case.

If you go into the case with -- and your whole position is based on an error of law, you lose the case. You don't get a redo.

And now $I$ think the Board should ask Ms. Bordelon and Mr. Langston if they think that it's basis for a new case, that one party was mistaken on the appropriate burden of proof, because as it stands, the remedy appropriate from the current proposed findings of fact and conclusion of law
would be a new trial, in which MEIC would have to prepare on the assumption that they bore the burden of proof.

But that's just not how it works, and I invite the Board to ask Ms. Bordelon or Mr. Langston to clarify that point, because from our perspective, they're just mistaken.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Well, $I$ really don't want to get a lot of back and forth here, but since you asked the question, Mr. Hernandez, I'm going to let Ms. Bordelon respond.

MS. BORDELON: There's a fundamental difference here and that Mr. Hernandez is overlooking, which is that the question of burden of proof was litigated in this case, and was resolved at summary judgment against MEIC.

The Hearing Examiner issued a decision stating that the burden of proof rested with MEIC as the Petitioner. This wasn't a mere mistake of theory of law, theory of the case, this was a decision issued by the Board's delegated Hearing Examiner, which makes a fundamental difference in my mind.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thank you. Board Member Reiten, did we help you?

BOARD MEMBER REITEN: I guess. I think it helps. It does help. I'm thinking of what the whole underlying issue is, and eventually it goes back to: Is there water available or not? So that's kind of where I'm going.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Understood. Thank you. Any more questions from the Board?
(No response)
CHAIR RUFFATTO: Well, $I$ don't think we're precluded from asking more questions, but I think it would be appropriate if we had a motion from the Board that we can consider, and then consider and then discuss that motion. I'm not trying to cut off any discussion or any questions, but let's get a motion on the table and see where we go.

BOARD MEMBER SIMPSON: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to move, make a motion that the Department's petition be denied, and that we proceed with the case, and move forward with a decision based on the facts at the next Board meeting.

BOARD MEMBER LEHNHERR: I will second that.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Is there discussion?
BOARD MEMBER AGUIRRE: I guess I just
want to be clear on what that does. It kind of goes back to Jon's question on -- Like April 1st, kind of how this proceeds, and the time frame. I don't know if $I$ 'm asking that right, but - -

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Can I ask you: What is the April 1st date important for for your question? Are you thinking about the April 1st date that is embodied in the District Court's decision?

BOARD MEMBER AGUIRRE: Yes.
CHAIR RUFFATTO: I don't think that we're affecting that at all. I mean that may affect how the proceeding in the AM4 case goes, but that date $I$ don't think has any relevance to us, because that relates to whether mining can occur at the Rosebud Mine, and it doesn't affect how the Signal Peak mine will go. Does that help?

BOARD MEMBER AGUIRRE: I think so. CHAIR RUFFATTO: Any more discussion? (No response) CHAIR RUFFATTO: I will offer my thoughts. I think that either granting or denying this motion is within the Board's discretion, and I don't think it will be an abuse of discretion on either side. I think this is within our
discretion. It is, as the parties have argued, it's a weighing of competing interests and various competing interests, so $I$ don't think that we will be abusing our discretion whichever way we go.

Having said that, $I$ would lean towards granting the stay, but that's -- I'm not strongly of that view. I'm not -- and the reason $I$ go there is that $I$ think the Board is in kind of a difficult spot to figure out how we deal with the AM4 decision, but we can certainly deal with that, and we will if the stay is not granted.

And so I think what would happen if the stay is not granted is we will set this for oral argument at the next meeting on the proposed findings of fact, and we will go from there.

BOARD MEMBER AGUIRRE: Chairman, that was kind of the line of questioning that $I$ was going down, because it seemed to me that granting the stay seemed to be the best option for where we're at versus not. In my, you know, from a legal --

I'm not coming from a legal stance, but more just all of the components of this, and where we're at now, and the fact that people have talked about here we are after five years.

So I think hearing your comment really speaks to what $I$ was trying to ask not very eloquently from a legal standpoint, but it seemed to me like the stay was, in my mind, the better way to move forward.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Ms. Altemus, Board
Member Altemus.
BOARD MEMBER ALTEMUS: Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I guess if $I$ may ask a question of Mr. Simpson. I guess $I$ was thinking along the same lines as you, Mr. Chair, that the stay might be more appropriate, but $I$ would ask Mr. Simpson maybe if he could provide some thoughts as to his reasoning to move forward with his motion. May I ask that question?

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Of course. Mr.
Simpson.
BOARD MEMBER SIMPSON: Mr. Chairman, Member Altemus. My reasoning is that we made a -I think it's been made clear that we are not bound by the case in question for a couple reasons, and there's nothing preventing our moving forward with this. We in our last Board package received all of the materials on this case that make it ripe for a decision on the merits.

This question of burden of proof in my mind is really -- there's a lot of paper been generated on it, but in my mind it's really irrelevant from a practical standpoint, and that is because our job here is to make a determination as to whether or not the Signal Peak application meets the requirements of the statute and the rules.

And we have a lot of paper been generated to provide us with the information that we need to make a decision. I think it's ripe for a decision. I think if we do move ahead with this, and the District Court decision is ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court -- which I think is very unlikely, based on past precedent. It could happen. We can't guess what they're going to do -- but the worst that could happen is that it would be remanded to us, and it would have to be retried.

And so I don't really -- and so let's back up and say that we decide to grant the petition. What happens then? Well, I think the same thing happens. It goes back and is retried based on a different burden of proof, so we end up with the same result. So that's really the basis
for my motion.
CHAIR RUFFATTO: Dr. Lehnherr.
BOARD MEMBER LEHNHERR: Chairman
Ruffatto, if $I$ could speak. I don't know if Board Member Smith had a comment. I've spoken already. I would like to say something, but maybe Joe Smith would like to say something before me.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Go ahead, Doctor.
You're on.
BOARD MEMBER LEHNHERR: Not unlike some of the cases that come before the Board, it is somewhat confusing, and as Chairman Ruffatto alludes to, there are justifications for going either way.

I tend to be in support of this motion. We are trying to, this Board has been trying to expedite cases, make the process more efficient. If we grant a stay, it's unclear how long it will be before the Supreme Court deals with this issue.

There's a FOFCOL in this case. I've been involved in hearing oral arguments before, and it's work, and it's time consuming, and sometimes there's still a fog that is there that becomes a little bit less foggy after you've spent all day listening to a case.

But despite the onus that it puts on $u s$, it would -- we're sort of trading a more, or we're sort of putting a more certain time frame on dealing with this as opposed to granting a stay, and hoping that the forces, the multiple factors come together, and there isn't a really prolonged delay in an appeal getting to the Supreme Court, or appeals getting to the Supreme Court.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thanks, Doctor. Board Member Smith, did you have something to offer?

BOARD MEMBER SMITH: Yes. I don't necessarily have a comment, other than $I$ wanted to ask the same question that Ms. Altemus asked of Mr. Simpson for his rationale. I assume his rationale was more on expediency, being that that's something we've talked about a lot in the past, which Dr. Lehnherr pointed out.

But it sounds like there's more to it than that. That was mainly a -- $I$ just want to ask Mr. Simpson where he was coming from on that, and touch on the expediency route.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thank you. More discussion?
(No response)
CHAIR RUFFATTO: Before we vote, I would
like to take five minutes, because there have been some good points made here that maybe I haven't thought about, so $I$ want to take about five minutes to think through some things before $I$ vote, and so $I$ would like to take a five minute break, and we'll come back and vote at that time, unless there's more discussion. We will reconvene at 11:42. Thank you.
(Recess taken)
CHAIR RUFFATTO: Let's reconvene. And
Sandy, I hate to do this to you, but would you please call the roll one more time.

MS . MOISEY-SCHERER: Chairman. CHAIR RUFFATTO: Here. MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: Mr. Lehnherr. BOARD MEMBER LEHNHERR: Here. MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: Mr. Reiten.

BOARD MEMBER REITEN: Here.
MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: Mr. Simpson.
BOARD MEMBER SIMPSON: Here.
MS . MOISEY-SCHERER: Ms. Altemus.
BOARD MEMBER ALTEMUS: Here.
MS . MOISEY-SCHERER: Ms. Aguirre.
BOARD MEMBER AGUIRRE: Here.
CHAIR RUFFATTO: Thank you. We have a
quorum.
As $I$ told you, $I$ think we can go either way on this, and we will not be abusing our discretion. And the points that Dr. Lehnherr and Board Member Simpson made are persuasive to me, in particular the idea that it's all teed up at this point. We can make a decision, and whatever we do there's a potential for being reversed, and so I am going to vote against the stay.

So $I$ wanted to pass that along. And just so you know what $I$ 'm thinking, if that motion passes, $I$ intend to make a second motion that the parties be asked to give us a very short brief on the issue that seems pretty central to our decision, and that is the binding effect of the AM4 decision, District Court decision. I just wanted to say that so you wouldn't be surprised when $I$ do that if this motion passes. So any more discussion?
(No response)
CHAIR RUFFATTO: A motion has been made and seconded to deny the stay requested by $D E Q$. All in favor, say aye.
(Response)
CHAIR RUFFATTO: Opposed, nay.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Nay.
CHAIR RUFFATTO: I think we should take a roll call vote, just to make sure we don't have any doubt here. So Sandy, would you please call the roll and we'll vote. So all in favor of -Well, call the roll, and say either yea or nay. MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: Chairman. CHAIR RUFFATTO: Yea. MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: Mr. Smith. BOARD MEMBER SMITH: Yea. MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: Mr. Lehnherr. BOARD MEMBER LEHNHERR: Yea. MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: Mr. Reiten.

BOARD MEMBER REITEN: Yea.
MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: Mr. Simpson.
BOARD MEMBER SIMPSON: Yea.
MS. MOISEY-SCHERER: Ms. Altemus.
BOARD MEMBER ALTEMUS: Yea.
MS . MOISEY-SCHERER: Ms. Aguirre.
BOARD MEMBER AGUIRRE: Nay.
CHAIR RUFFATTO: All right. The motion passes.

And so $I$ would like to make a motion that the parties be asked to submit a short, limited to five pages, brief on the question of
whether the AM4 District Court decision is binding on this Board, and that that brief be submitted by the 18 th of March, and there will only be one round of briefs; no responses, just one brief from each party on that issue. Is there a second to my motion?

BOARD MEMBER REITEN: I'll second it. CHAIR RUFFATTO: Discussion.
(No response)
CHAIR RUFFATTO: A motion has been made and seconded that the parties be directed to file briefs limited to five pages by March 18 th on the question of the binding effect of the AM4 District Court decision on this Board. All in favor, say aye.
(Response)
CHAIR RUFFATTO: Opposed, nay.
(No response)
CHAIR RUFFATTO: The motion passes. We will not be issuing a written order, so $I$ want to make sure that the parties understand what the directive is. March 18 th is the deadline for that brief if you want to file one. Okay.

MS. BORDELON: Mr. Chairman, is the Board scheduling the merits argument for its next
hearing, or will the parties be informed of the Board's decision on the binding nature before the hearing?

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Good question. Board members, do you have a view of that? I will offer my view, because $I$ think -- and then you can weigh in or disagree with me, and change my mind. That's kind of easy to do sometimes.

I think we should hear oral arguments on the findings of fact and conclusions of law at the next Board meeting, and as part of that we will address the question of binding effects of the District Court decision.

So I guess what I'm saying is in my view, we plan on addressing all of the issues at the next meeting on this matter.

BOARD MEMBER AGUIRRE: Chairman.
CHAIR RUFFATTO: Yes.
BOARD MEMBER AGUIRRE: I would like to understand why we would not address the binding argument prior to the oral arguments. I'm, again, not a lawyer, so I'm just trying to figure out process, and how that weighs into the oral arguments, the basis of the oral arguments.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Well, we could take it
in two steps, but $I$ don't think it's necessary, because already presented in the case before the District Court decision was the question of burden of proof, and all this does is help us decide that question with this additional development.

So we had that issue in front of us regardless of whether or not the AM4 decision had come out, so it's just one element of the issues that will be before us at our next meeting. Does that help?

BOARD MEMBER AGUIRRE: I don't know, because it seems -- and I might be missing something, so help me through this. It seems like it would help my thought process, when $I$ hear oral arguments, to understand that binding matter prior. But again, I'm not a legal -- I'm not a lawyer, so --

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Any other thoughts from Board members? Let's try to answer that. Board Member Simpson. It seems to me you have your hand up.

BOARD MEMBER SIMPSON: Mr. Chairman, I do. Thank you. Unless $I$ missed something, all three of the parties in their oral argument today in response to questions are in concurrence that
the District Court decision is not binding on this Board. Am I correct?

CHAIR RUFFATTO: No.
BOARD MEMBER SIMPSON: I'm not?
CHAIR RUFFATTO: I'm pretty confident that MEIC says it is binding.

BOARD MEMBER SIMPSON: Well, then I misunderstood. I'm sorry.

BOARD MEMBER AGUIRRE: Right, and that's the reasoning for my questioning, right there, is that there isn't agreement on that.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: No, and $I$ understand that. But there was disagreement on the proper burden of proof even before this other development occurred.

So MEIC has been arguing in the case that we were, or that the Board -- that the Hearing Examiner had applied the wrong burden of proof, and that issue was in the case before this. Now this is just one more factor we have to take into account in deciding that issue.

BOARD MEMBER AGUIRRE: Okay. Thank you.
CHAIR RUFFATTO: I am going to just state that as Chairman, we're going to put the oral argument for the binding effect, as well as
all the other oral arguments on the FOFCOL, for the next meeting, and we'll go that route unless someone wants to make a motion to the contrary. Mr. Simpson.

BOARD MEMBER SIMPSON: I'm a little bit confused here, because the MEIC, the Petitioner, has argued that we should not -- that we should not affirm the Department's petition. And so in that case, we would be going ahead with this.

Now, my understanding is that MEIC does not agree that we are not bound by the District Court decision. There seems to me to be an inconsistency there.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Mr. Hernandez, would you like to address MEIC's position.

MR. HERNANDEZ: If I understand the question correctly, the question is MEIC's position with respect to the binding nature of the Rosebud decision on the Board of Environmental Review? Is that the question?

BOARD MEMBER SIMPSON: Yes.
MR. HERNANDEZ: Our position is that under judicial review, the AM4 decision of the Board was reversed, and that reversal is binding on the Board.

Its applicability to this case, the Bull Mountain decision -- which wasn't reversed in the Rosebud decision -- I think is a little less clear, but we certainly would appreciate the opportunity to present a short brief on the binding nature of that for this case. Does that help?

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Actually that confuses me, Mr. Hernandez.

BOARD MEMBER AGUIRRE: I want to second that. It even makes the question $I$ was calling even more relevant, $I$ think.

CHAIR RUFFATTO: Good work, Mr. Simpson, Ms. Aguirre, for smoking that out. That suggests to me -- I mean I think that you're right, Board Member Simpson, that there was an inconsistency in MEIC's arguments.

For purposes of -- now that Mr.
Hernandez has answered. For purposes of the FOFCOL, it's very clear that they argued that the Board was bound by that decision. For purposes of the stay motion, they argued there was a difference. So there is an inconsistency there that you saw.

So I think it's important that we get
that briefed, because now Mr. Hernandez is saying it's unclear of whether or not it's binding. So I think we need to get that briefed.

So I have to ask you, Mr. Simpson, would that change your position on the stay?

BOARD MEMBER SIMPSON: No.
CHAIR RUFFATTO: I think where we're at, we're almost at noon, and so I think -- Go ahead, Dr. Lehnherr.

BOARD MEMBER LEHNHERR: I just want to share that it's certainly not uncommon with these complex cases to have confusion. I have certainly seen it in the past.

But I'm wondering when we're talking about binding, $I$ 'm wondering about the terminology here. When we're talking about binding, ultimately isn't that something that the Supreme Court would decide as opposed to -- Well, sure, what the District Court has decided may not be applicable in this case, but whether or not it's binding.

And like $I$ say, maybe it's a matter of semantics, but how binding it really is, doesn't that really depend on what the Supreme Court might ultimately decide?

CHAIR RUFFATTO: That's a really good question, Doctor, but there is a difference in the law between binding and persuasive, and what -and these arguments have not been fleshed out in the briefs. That's why $I$ wanted more briefs.

But Signal Peak has argued that at most it's persuasive and not binding. If once the Supreme Court rules, whichever way it rules, that will be binding, and we would be duty bound to follow that. Does that answer your question? But I believe that --

BOARD MEMBER LEHNHERR: Yes.
CHAIR RUFFATTO: -- MEIC is arguing that we're bound by the District Court decision because it is a Court decision, which therefore at a higher level in the process -- I'm not going to call it the judicial process -- but at a higher level than we are. Any more discussion?
(No response)
CHAIR RUFFATTO: If I could summarize, we're going to, at the next meeting, we're going to consider the FOFCOL, along with the issue of the binding or versus persuasive effect of the AM4 District Court decision. Any questions?
(No response)


STATE OF MONTANA

COUNTY OF LEWIS \& CLARK )
I, LAURIE CRUTCHER, RPR, Court Reporter, Notary Public in and for the County of Lewis \& Clark, State of Montana, do hereby certify:

That the proceedings were taken before me at the time and place herein named; that the proceedings were reported by me in shorthand and transcribed using computer-aided transcription, and that the foregoing - 80 - pages contain a true record of the proceedings to the best of my ability.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial seal this 11 th day of March, 2022 .

LAURIE CRUTCHER, RPR
Court Reporter - Notary Public
My commission expires
March 9, 2024.


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