101615_BER2013-07SM BEFORE THE BOARD OF ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2 IN THE MATTER OF AMENDMENT No. 3 4 5 TO THE MINING PERMIT FOR BULL 6 7 MOUNTAIN COAL MINE NO. 1 (PERMIT ID: SMP C1993017) 8

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Heard at Room 111 of the Metcalf Building 1520 East Sixth Avenue Helena, Montana October 16, 2015 11:35 a.m.

BEFORE CHAIRMAN JOAN MILES, BOARD MEMBERS CHRIS TWEETEN, DR. ROBERT BYRON, ROY SAYLES O' CONNOR, MICHELE REINHART-LEVINE; and HEARINGS EXAMINER BEN REED.

PREPARED BY: LAURI E CRUTCHER, RPR COURT REPORTER, NOTARY PUBLIC

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10 **ENERGY:**

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> WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were Page 1

had:

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 (MS. CANTY NOT PRESENT)

CHAIRMAN MILES: We'll reconvene the meeting. And we were taking final action on the matter of the notice of appeal for hearing by Montana Environmental Information Center regarding DEQ's approval of coal mine permit issued to Signal Peak Energy.

As you all recall, we had testimony in July regarding the motions for summary judgment, and we have now been provided with several proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and presumably our role is to adopt one of those. I'm going turn it over to Ben to really

talk about what kind of options we have for action, time frames that we're required to act under; and also if you could kind of give us some guidance and side boards on what kind of a discussion we can have today regarding this, I'd appreciate that.

MR. REED: Thank you, Madam Chair. The proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law have been submitted. Clearly they're very

I engthy.

If I can begin with your last question first, Madam Chair. As far as the side boards to the issue, the primary issue that is going to be decided today, or that the Board may choose to decide today, is whether or not there is sufficient material within these proposed findings of fact and the conclusions of law to allow the Board to make a decision on them without any further hearing; and whether it is possible to rule in favor of either the Appellant MEIC or in favor of the Department of Environmental Quality today without a hearing, without an elicitation of further facts.

CHAIRMAN MILES: Ben, so a further

hearing, how would that be focused?

MR. REED: That's an interesting

question, Madam Chair. It would essentially I think very much follow the pattern of the hearing that took place previously, except that the issues that were presented during the hearing would be essentially questions of fact.

I think that probably what would happen would be that the experts for either side would come before the Board and explain -- for example,

just to pick an issue that seems to be a significant one -- why those experts regard the CHIA as sufficient or insufficient in terms of this coal mine permit. The hearing would of course be guided by both the parties -- or would be guided by the Board, and what the Board felt it needed to have presented to it.

Today's discussion should be focused on the question of whether the Board believes it has

the question of whether the Board believes it has enough information contained within the prior briefs supporting the various motions for summary judgment, and if the Board believes that it does,

then the Board can rule in favor of either MEIC or

the Department of Environmental Quality.

If the Board feels that there are issues within the briefs and within these proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law that require further exposition, or illumination, or explanation, then the Board can request further briefing by the parties; the Board can simply rule in favor of one party or the other; the Board can request further briefing from the parties on particular issues; or the Board can simply say that it does not feel that the matter has been sufficiently set out that there is enough

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> information that it can make a ruling based solely on the information that has been presented to it thus far.

> CHAIRMAN MILES: Ben, a couple of So if we were to rule in favor further questions. of one of the parties, does that mean also that we would adopt the findings of fact and conclusions

of law as presented by that party?

MR. REED: Broadly speaking, yes, Madam
Chair. The Board would be adopting the findings
of fact in whole or in part of that party. The Board would need to respond with specificity to each of the findings of fact proposed by the other party, explaining why it had not taken on those findings of fact. If the Board does make a decision, the Board has ninety days, as set out in statute, to have a final order put together on that decision, with an extra thirty days if there is good cause required.

CHAIRMÁN MILES: And that ninety day time period has not started running yet because we have not determined that we have all of the information we need; is that what you explained to

me earlier?

MR. REED: The way that the statute

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reads is that as soon as the -- let me actually find the statute.

MR. TWEETEN: It's 2-4-623.

MR. REED: Thank you, Mr. Tweeten. final decision must be issued within ninety days after a contested case is considered to be submitted for a final decision. So at this point, the Board has not indicated whether it considers the matter submitted for a final decision, or whether further briefing is required, or whether

further hearings are required.

MR. TWEETEN: Madam Chair.

As I recall the last meeting, the Board did not declare the hearing concluded. The Board recessed rather than concluded the hearing specifically because of this question of when the ninety day time period was going to run. So I think as things stand now, we have not triggered the running of that because we have not finally determined that the hearing is concluded and the matter is submitted.

So if we are to take action today, I think the first thing is that as part of that we have to declare the hearing concluded, and then

101615 BER2013-07SM decide what action we want to take, and then from that point we would have ninety days. 8000 CHAIRMAN MILES: But we can undertake discussion prior to doing that?
MR. TWEETEN: I think we certainly can, yes. CHAIRMAN MILES: Then my last question Is discussion now solely among the Board members? Do we have opportunities to ask questions of you or -- obviously we can ask them of you -- but any other parties? MR. REÉD: Madam Chair, as Mr. Tweeten points out, because the hearing was only recessed and parties are in fact present, I believe it would be appropriate, it is absolutely appropriate for the Board to ask the parties questions, and to entertain discussion. Then of course I'm always here, too. MR. TWEETEN: Just a question or point of clarification maybe. If we were to decide the matter in favor of one party or another of the moving parties for summary judgment, then would Ben undertake the task of creating our findings of fact and conclusions of law? So it would be your responsibility to wade through 300 findings of fact from the various parties, and figure out which ones we would need to adopt in order to 0009 support a decision that we decided to make? MR. REED: Madam Chair, Mr. Tweeten, it would be my pleasure to do so. MR. TWEETEN: You're You're a strange man, Mr. Reed. MR. REED: All levity aside, there are I think two chores for whoever this gets dropped on, which is I believe likely to be me. One is both to go through the findings of fact, and see which need to be adopted; and the second is that the statute requires that to the degree that a party has submitted proposed findings of fact, and the Board does not follow those findings of fact, the Board needs to explain why either it has not followed those findings of fact, whether the Board finds those not to be persuasive, or whether the Board finds them not to be as useful in guiding its decision, or whatever the Board's decision may CHAIRMAN MILES: Is that in respect to all of the findings of facts from all parties that we don't include? And you said something about doing that individually. MR. REED: The way that the statute reads, Madam Chair, I believe it is that if a 0010 party is ruled against, and it has submitted

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findings of fact, each and every one of those findings of fact needs to be addressed.

MR. TWEETEN: But, Madam Chair, it is permissible to group them together, so that if you have two dozen proposed findings that the Board deems to be irrelevant to its ultimate decision, you can just say "Findings of fact one, four, six, Page 4

seven, and so on, are not accepted by the Board because they're deemed to be irrelevant," or whatever. So you can group the ones that are ruled upon similarly together, so that you don't have to have a 500 page document.

CHAIRMAN MILES: Does anyone else have

CHAIRMAN MILES: Does anyone else have procedural questions for Ben before we open discussion?

(No response)

CHAIRMAN MILES: Let's open discussion. Anyone want to start? I think we can just start to get input from some people on your review of these proposals.

MR. TWEETEN: Madam Chair, if I might. One question that's raised by MEIC regarding the Department's position has to do with the application of what I call the four corners rule

to the CHIA, in other words, whether the Department can buttress its factual arguments and the factual materials on which it wants to rely to support the CHIA with additional facts and arguments that weren't considered at the time that the CHIA was adopted.

And I'm persuaded that lawfully that's not permissible, that the matter that we consider is confined to the administrative record, and it is not appropriate for the Department to go outside the factual record at least that was in front of the agency, and now at this stage during the contested case argue additional facts or additional considerations that weren't considered at that time.

And I rely for that on Section 2-4-623 Sub (2) which says that, "Findings of fact must be based exclusively on the evidence and on matters officially noticed." I think by the evidence, it means the evidence that is in front of the agency. The administrative record that's in front of us, because of the cross motions for summary judgment that have been filed, but there is no other evidence, and that's as I understand it the reason why the parties take the position that there is no

genuine issue of material fact.

But bringing additional evidence outside that record, or attempting to bring additional evidence or additional spins on the evidence in front of the Board that are not part of the administrative record I don't think is permissible.

So I would recommend that the Board confine its consideration, for purposes of the findings of fact, to those matters that were officially part of the record in front of the agency when it made its decision that's before us on appeal.

CHAIRMAN MILES: Thank you. And are you able to identify which particular findings presented by the Department involve additional material?

MR. TWEETEN: Madam Chair, I haven't tracked them down number by number, but they're Page 5

101615_BER2013-07SM described in the MEIC findings of fact and So I think Ben could root conclusions of law. those out based on the map that's provided in the MEIC findings and conclusions. CHAIRMAN MILES: Any further discussion? I guess I'll move to MR. TWEETEN: another point then. At the July meeting I was among those who was concerned about whether the

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25 0015 MEIC as a moving party, and then the company as cross-moving party, had sufficiently excluded the existence of genuine issues of material fact, because under the Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment can't be used as a method of sorting out disputes as to what the facts are.

The facts have to be undisputed for a summary judgment to be rendered, and that's the choice we have, is do we make summary judgment now, or do we remand it for an evidentiary hearing, at which point it would be appropriate for the Department to ask the Hearing Examiner what evidence would be permissible and so forth.

And so the point is that we have to decide whether these motions, cross motions are properly supported initially, before we can get on to the question of what we want to do about the merits.

I guess after reflecting on the parties' proposed findings and conclusions, and upon my conviction that it is only appropriate to consider those matters that are part of the administrative record, and the further point that nobody seems to

be interested in challenging the factual bases that are part of the CHIA or part of the other fact finding documents that are in the administrative record, it seems to me that it is probably appropriate to go ahead and consider on summary judgment whether the permit was properly issued or not, taking into consideration and limiting our consideration to those particular allegations of error that have been made by the MEIC in their appeal from the Department's deci si on.

So I would throw that out for the Board's consideration. I don't know whether any of you have thought about that or have any differing views on that. As long as the parties are prepared to acknowledge the accuracy of what's in the administrative record, and nobody wants to challenge the factual accuracy of anything that's in the record, I think that summary judgment is probably appropriate.

MR. O' CONNOR: Madam Chair, a couple of comments. I'm not so strong on the legal aspects, but I have a real issue with some of the facts and timelines, such as fifty years, after fifty years nobody cares. Well, some of us here are over

fifty years old, and we are living with the problems that occurred fifty years ago or more. So we should care about fifty years, and what's happening with the available water for the

necessary uses that landowners adjacent to it have, into the streams and tributaries they flow into.

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The other real issue I have is it was probably outlined in both, but the issue of mitigation on a large coal mine, and there's springs on the property, there is headwaters to a few creeks and things like that, and the amount of available water to use to mitigate the losses that would occur over a 6,000 or 7,000 acre parcel really concern me, and I don't see any answers there. And I'm not sure if that's a legal issue or not. But putting a well down and saying, "Well, we'll mitigate," with what, and where are you going to get it? I don't have those answers; at least in the readings, I did not find those answers.

MR. DAVID: Madam Chair, DEQ would like to be heard on the issue about mitigation. think DEQ has some information for the Board that might assist it in its deliberations.

> MR. HERNANDEZ: May I object? CHAIRMAN MILES: Yes.

MR. HERNANDEZ: It's my understanding that we're not presenting evidence, but if the Board should have questions on any of these issues, it is the Board's prerogative to ask the parties to answer questions, rather than the parties having the authority to just present argument where they can deem appropriate.

CHAIRMAN MILES: I think that's correct.

I guess the question is do we --MR. O' CONNOR: I was putting this out to the Board really. I was not asking the question. I was clarifying. These are real problems I have with the position of the DEQ, and I guess Signal

MR. TWEETEN: Madam Chair, I share the concern about the fifty year time horizon that the Department apparently employed in deciding on the likelihood of adverse impacts to water outside of the mine area. I don't see anything in the statutes or regulations that refers to the creation of a time horizon, or I didn't see anything in the findings and conclusions to suggest that the fifty year time horizon was for

some reason more appropriate than 100 years, or ten years, or 200 years.

Why the model was created with this fifty year time horizon in it is something, as far as I can tell from reading the parties' findings, is unexplained. So I think there is a legal error in adopting a timeline where one doesn't exist in the statutes and regulations. There a question, even if it were appropriate to adopt the timeline, whether the evidence in the record supports the appropriateness of this one as opposed to some other one.

For all the record shows, this was an arbitrary figure that was picked by the Department, as far as I can tell, without much Page 7

explanation as to why it is the appropriate number. So that is I think an error that is significant in terms of the final outcome of the Department's considerations, because apparently from all that appears in the record, there was no mechanism in place for the Department to determine whether water quality outside of the mine area might potentially be affected 75 or 100 years down the road.

Then they have calculated how far the

polluted water is likely to travel within this fifty year time horizon, but at that point their analysis seems to stop, and I don't find a legal basis for that in either the statute or regulations.

So I think on that basis alone, I would support remanding this matter to the Department for further proceedings, in which the parties can fill that out, and the Department could explain its reasoning, and the MEIC can introduce its thoughts about whether what the Department did is right or wrong, but as it stands right now, I don't think the evidence is sufficient to support what the Department did.

CHAIRMAN MILES: Are you saying then that we need to discuss -- I think we need to wait for you for a minute, and if we'd like to hear from the Department, we will, and we will also call other narties

call other parties.

MR. DAVID: I just wanted to clarify why I'm standing here, is that Board Member Sayles O'Connor indicated that he was concerned about the sufficiency of replacement water. If that issue is going to be an issue the Board is going to determine, use as its determination, the

Department has procedural information that the Board needs to consider before it goes down that road so it doesn't commit an error.

So the Department would like to be heard. Of course, MEIC can then respond to the Department's concerns, but I'll just leave that for you guys to ponder.

CHAIRMAN MILES: Thank you.

MR. TWEETEN: I think we can defer on that for now because that's not the topic we're talking about.

chairman Miles: Your question about remanding for further proceedings about the fifty years, wouldn't that introduce new evidence that we have -- I think I concur with what you have said, that it has to be what's in the record.

MR. TWEETEN: There might be something in the record that hasn't been focused on in the proposed findings and conclusions. And I for one have to confess I haven't sifted through the entire administrative record. I haven't looked at much of it, any of it, other than the CHIA itself, and so I'm really not in a position to know what's in the administrative record.

If there's some justification on that

that the parties haven't argued yet, then there would be an opportunity to make a record of that, either through pointing us to the place in the record where that information is; MEIC obviously would, I'm guessing, dispute whatever the Department says in terms of a time horizon

would, I'm guessing, dispute whatever the Department says in terms of a time horizon.

So that's a point that hasn't been -- It has been argued that it's deficient because of the fifty year time horizon, but I'm not convinced that that issue has been considered thoroughly enough by us. It may be that rather than remand it for hearing, we just remand it to the Department and tell them to fix it; tell them as a matter of law that the Board finds that they have to consider this without a time horizon, unless it is completely infeasible to do that, or make a record as least as to why fifty years is an appropriate time horizon or whether some other would be more appropriate.

MS. REINHART-LEVINE: Madam Chair, Mr. Tweeten. Are you proposing that we basically hold off on making any decision on summary judgment one way or the other, and that we are basically asking for additional information at this time from the parties prior to making a decision in summary

MR. TWEETEN: Madam Chair. I guess I'm not suggesting the latter. What I'm suggesting is that we should grant summary judgment to MEIC at least on that issue -- and maybe other members of the Board have other issues that they want to bring up and discuss as well -- but at least on that issue, I think what the Department has done is deficient, or at least not supported by statute or rule; and that at a minimum, I would at the appropriate time move the Board to grant summary judgment to MEIC on that limited issue, and remand it to the Department for further work on the record of the decision in order to fill in that gap, and maybe that requires recalibrating the model in some way to fix that.

MS. REINHART-LEVINE: Madam Chair, a question for Mr. Reed. If we grant summary judgment to one party or the other, my understanding is one of the parties will then probably appeal to District Court. When are we able to remand items to the Department? Is that an option available to us? If so, can we do that?

MR. REED: I don't believe the matter can simply be remanded to the Department.

25 can simply be remanded to the Department. 0022

believe that if summary judgment is granted for MEIC, then the permit returns -- then the permit is -- I'm not sure whether the permit is void, or if the permit at that point will be reviewed by, will be re-reviewed by DEQ, which can then establish the factual basis that would respond to Mr. Tweeten's concerns. I honestly don't know the answer.

MR. TWEETEN: Perhaps I can clarify. My intention would be to vacate the permit, and remand the matter to DEQ for further proceedings

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on a permit application consistent with our decision, which I think is permissible at this stage, and that tees it up for District Court review in the event that the Department wants to stand on the existing permit with the existing supporting information that's in the record, and appeal our decision to District Court, then the Department I think could do that, couldn't it?

MR. REED: I believe so, yes.
MR. TWEETEN: And the other option the
Department would have to have at that point would
be to accept the remand, and go back and buttress
the decision record with additional information
responding to that particular defect, and then

based on that information, either grant or deny the permit. Either way I suspect the matter will come back to us for our consideration.

But I'm convinced, and there are lots and lots of arguments flying back and forth about what may or may not be wrong with this permit. All I'm saying is that I think this one is well taken, and that by itself it is grounds for vacating the permit, and sending it back to DEQ for more work.

CHAIRMAN MILES: Thank you. Other comments? I guess I would just say -- I agree. From my review of the various proposals we were given -- and I will admit to a lot of confusion, because I kept going back to what you were talking about, that the parties had agreed there was not a dispute about factual items, and yet we were given -- The proposals are just flooded with facts which I didn't feel really addressed, as I understood, some of the issues that we talked about during the July meeting about really does the law in this instance require prevention or mitigation of damage, what is material damage, and what is required --

I mean there was a lot of discussion in

MEIC's proposal about the Class 2 to Class 3 degradation. I did not really see that addressed in the Department's proposal. I also was concerned about the fifty years, and that felt arbitrary at that point. So I probably at this point agree with the approach that Mr. Tweeten is suggesting.

Are there further discussion, comments, questions? There is no motion on the floor yet.

MR. TWEETEN: Madam Chair, a couple of other issues that have been raised, and I think that if we are to vacate and remand ought to be considered, and more fully fleshed out by the Department, with some supporting legal authority if possible.

In the statute it is required that the permit be designed to prevent -- I'm paraphrasing here -- but to prevent adverse impact to water quality outside of the mine area. That's a statutory requirement. And there are a couple of issues related to each other that I think are argued by MEIC and are subsumed within that

101615_BER2013-07SM statutory definition. One is what does prevent mean? Does prevent mean stop, or does prevent mean mitigate to the greatest extent possible,

which is I think what the Department argues is the responsibility.

So what was the intention of the Legislature when they used the word "prevent" as opposed to the word "mitigate." I think that's a fair question. The word is prevent, the word is not mitigate, and there is no way -- If the Legislature had meant mitigate, it could have said so. I think there are other environmental reclamation statutes where mitigation is a part of a reclamation plan. So there is that, just generally what does prevent mean.

And then on top of that specifically for purposes of this case, there is a discussion of deep groundwater aquifers, and the ability to bring up additional water presumably to dilute the available groundwater supply to make it more acceptable and usable. Is that kind of mitigation within the concept of prevention or not? And that's an argument that was briefed by MEIC.

Again, I'm not sure I've identified anywhere in the Department's argumentation where

Again, I'm not sure I've identified anywhere in the Department's argumentation where that particular issue is fleshed out. So if we are going to remand I'd like to suggest that that be among the questions that we ask the Department

to answer, if it decides to -- if it wants to grant this permit, that it needs to have some sort of a rationale, or why this concept of mitigation water is even relevant when the term in the statute is prevent, and not mitigate.

Then overarching all of that is the statutory language that says that the project needs to be designed to prevent. It doesn't say it needs to prevent, it says it needs to be designed to prevent. What is the significance of the emphasis on design?

A project can -- If your hydrologists and engineers and so forth put together a plausible program for prevention, is that enough? Because I think you can argue with some justification that if they do that, it is designed to prevent. So why is the word "designed" in there, and what significance does that have on the Department's decision making?

That's a question that I don't think either party has really grappled with. MEIC I don't think has grappled with it very well in their proposed findings, and I don't think -- it certainly didn't look like a point of emphasis on the Department's part to me either.

So it is an obscure statute in a couple of different ways that might be worthy of further consideration by the Department in making its final decision. I'd love to have in front of us a cogent and encompassing definition of how the statute is supposed to work from the Department's viewpoint, including the question of design and

101615_BER2013-07SM what prevention means, and that would certainly 9 maybe do a couple things, I guess. One, it would give a signal to the regulated public as to how the Department plans to enforce this statute going forward, and it would certainly make our job easier in trying to figure out what to do with 10 11 12 13 these matters when they come in front of us under 14 this particular statuté. 15 So I'd like to have that -- if it is the 16 sense of the Board to remand this, then I think 17 that's another deficiency that I'd like to see 18 filled in, if possible. CHAIRMAN MILES: 19 20 Thank you. 21 comments? Discussion? DR. BYRON: Madam Chair, I think Mr. 22 Tweeten is alluding to the fact that we may have 23 24 sufficient information to make a decision on 25 summary judgment today. That's my take on your 0028 discussion. I guess where do we proceed from 1 2 here? CHAIRMAN MILES: Sufficient information because we're lacking information that we feel was 4 5 in the permitting process. 6 MR. TWĔETEN: Madam Chair, if we are 7 going to send this back, I think we owe it to the 8 parties to try to be as comprehensive as we can in 9 covering all of the things that we think need to be filled in here in order to make a complete 10 record of decision for granting this permit.

And I've pointed out the ones that have occurred to me, but I certainly don't want to exclude the possibility or likelihood that there 11 12 13 14 may be others in here that other members of the 15 Board might be concerned about, and I'd urge them 16 17 to articulate those as best we can, so that we 18 only have to do this once, as opposed to piecemealing it, sending it back multiple times, in the event that something could have been covered and wasn't at this stage.

CHAIRMAN MILES: I think that's 19 20 21 22 23 important. I think we need to think about that if 24 there are specific areas, but I wanted to just 25 comment about a statement you made, Chris, that I 0029 1 think articulated what was going through my head. 2 I'm really concerned about how enforcement of these particular statutory provisions would move forward, and I've been very reluctant to -- I think that MEIC has raised some 4 5 important issues again to things we've talked 6 7 about -- prevention versus mitigation, the 8 violation of standards, narrative standards versus 9 what is harming existing or anticipated uses. S I'm reluctant to sort of sweep those aside, and 10 have this happen again in the future that those 11 issues are not addressed.

So I think my position right now is very similar to your position on this. I do think we 12 13 14 need to think about what would be the specific 15 issues we need addressed. 16 17 MR. O'CONNOR: Madam Chair, for further 18 clarification on Class 2, Class 3, it seemed like Page 12

101615 BER2013-07SM Class 3 had a huge range for the EC. So I don't know if there is reasons it is Class 2 and Class 20 3, but it looks like maybe we could get more of a 21 definition on what is usable for human use. 3 is for washing food, I guess, but not for drinking. But still it is such a huge range. 22 23 24 25 Maybe a little better definition of that. 0030 CHAIRMAN MILES: But it was identified 2 that they would anticipate a degradation from Class 2 to Class 3. 4 MR. O'CONNOR: That's right, and "anticipate" probably means it is going to happen, but then where does that migrate to, and when, and things like that. We're dealing with a lot of 5 6 7 unknowns as far as whether the walls collapse or 8 9 don't collapse, and the water fills in, and the 10 gob, how it is goes going to affect the class of water quality when it starts to leave the mining 11 'I guess we don't have specific answers for 12 that, but clarification a little more would be 13 14 hel pful. 15 CHAIRMAN MILES: Is there a motion to consider this matter submitted for final decision, 16 I guess, and close the hearing? 17 MR. TWEETEN: Madam Chair, we do have 18 19 the parties represented in the room, and if 20 anybody has questions for them, we probably should entertain those before, get those out, and let
them respond to them before we make that -CHAIRMAN MILES: Do you have questions?
MR. TWEETEN: I don't think I have any 21 22 23 24 25 at this point. 0031 MR. O' CONNOR: 1 Can we actually do that, 2 if all the facts have been agreed upon, so to speak? I mean we don't think we have all the 4 facts. 5 MR. TWEETEN: I think it's certainly fair game to pose questions to the parties about 6 7 the arguments that have been made in their 8 proposed findings and conclusions which we didn't see prior to the July meeting, so those are newly in front of us. If there is anything in there 9 10 that somebody sees that they want to ask about, 11 think it would certainly be appropriate to do that 12 at this point before we close the hearing. 13 14 don't have any in particular that I want to pose, 15 but certainly --CHÁIRMAN MILES: If anyone does. 16 didn't see anything new in there. What I saw was 17 a lack of addressing some of the issues that had 18 19 been brought up in the July proceedings. 20 anyone have questions for the Department or the 21 parties? MS. REINHART-LEVINE: 22 Madam Chair, I 23 would like to hear from DEQ and MEIC regarding 24 mitigation and potential error that you were concerned the Board may be committing. I'd also 25 0032 specifically like to hear about degradation of 1 Class 2 waters to Class 3, because I do think that's an area where the permit is flawed. Page 13

like comment on those two things $\widehat{\mbox{from DEQ}}$ and then MEIC.

MR. DAVID: Madam Chair, members of the Board. Thank you very much for the opportunity to address this issue.

About the mitigation matter, DEQ would like to bring to the Board's attention that MEIC's proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law contains a Paragraph No. 133, and Paragraph 133 cites text from the PHC that allegedly contradicts DEQ's argument that sufficient replacement water is available in the deep aquifer to mitigate any adverse impacts to groundwater and surface water resources.

The citation set forth in Item 133 is an excerpt from Attachment 3-M of the groundwater model, which is attached to the PHC and included in the AM-3 permit that's included in MEIC Exhibit No. 6 in its entirety.

The text quoted by MEIC was not included in any briefs submitted by MEIC, or subject to any previous argument by MEIC to the Board. The

finding proposed in Paragraph 133 of MEIC's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law raises issues that cannot be addressed in the record before the Board in this proceeding. Specifically in Paragraph 133, MEIC does not reference or explain the recommendation for a study that followed the quotation.

Had the text excerpted from Attachment 3-M of the groundwater model been briefed by MEIC, DEQ would have had the opportunity to argue to the Board that the cited text was taken out of context, that it must be understood as an introduction to a recommendation to study the capacity of the deep underburden aquifer to serve as replacement water.

Because MEIC raised the argument for the first time in its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, DEQ is unable to demonstrate to the Board that the recommendation for investigation was included and made part of the PHC at Page 314-5-35, and as such is part of the AM-3 permit, and thereby obligated SPE to undertake the study. You can verify that through looking at MEIC Exhibit No. 5.

Had MEIC raised this issue in briefing,

DEQ would have had the opportunity to introduce evidence that the proposed study of the capacity of the underburden aquifer was undertaken and completed by SPE, and the results included in the permit as minor revision No. 205 in January of this year. Minor revision No. 205 is not part of the record before the Board.

Given the opportunity, DEQ would offer evidence to the Board that the study as adopted and approved in minor revision 205 indicates that the underburden aquifer is capable of supplying replacement water from multiple water sources that may be impacted by proposed mining activity in the life of mine area.

On the basis of the foregoing, DEQ requests, and if the Board sinclined to consider Paragraph No. 133 in its deliberations, that this proceeding be extended to afford the parties the opportunity to completely develop the record on this issue before the Board. So that's DEQ's concerns about the availability of mitigation water.

The other question about potential degradation of groundwater outside the permit boundary from Class 2 to Class 3 groundwater, DEQ

believes that this issue was addressed, and explored, and explained in detail in its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, specifically the mine is designed such that spoil water is not likely to migrate beyond the permit boundary given the design assumption that the gate roads will collapse. That is the basis of DEQ's support of the permit.

The mine is designed to prevent material damage because the gate roads would collapse, because when the gate roads collapse, mine pool water in the mined out area will not migrate beyond the permit boundary. If mine pool water is not going to migrate beyond the permit boundary, then Class 2 water is not going to change to Class 3 water. There is not going to be any degradation.

That's the basis for DEQ's -- it is very, very simple. DEQ didn't address that issue because the permit is based on the finding in the CHIA and the PHC that that migration is not going to occur. The Board needs to keep in mind that the standard for material damage applies to impacts to the hydrologic balance outside of the permit boundary. Although the CHIA does describe

potential impacts within the permit boundary, that is subject to a far different standard for potential impacts within the permit boundary. The mine must demonstrate that the disturbances are minimized. Totally different standard.

MR. TWEETEN: Counsel, can I ask you a question. MEIC argues in their findings and conclusions that SPE and the Department conceded that they don't know whether the walls are going to collapse or not, and that the assumption that they will doesn't appear to have been reasonably based on evidence, if I understand their argument correctly. Are they wrong about that? Did you not base -- Was that evidence not in the record that it was unclear whether those would collapse or not?

MR. DAVID: Madam Chair, Board member Tweeten, the evidence is in the record. The original permit, which is part of the record in this proceeding, contains the letter by the mining engineer that says that the gate roads are designed to collapse with time. It is a matter of fact that the Bureau of Land Management EA that MEIC cites also states that the presumption is that the gate road would collapse with time. It

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      is a fact that's in the evidence of this -- in the
      administrative record in this proceeding, and
      there is no contradictory evidence.
      MR. TWEETEN: Counsel, my question is not what the assumption was. I understand what
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      your assumption was. My question was whether
      ğiven the uncertainty about whether that would
      actually occur or not, whether that presumption or
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      assumption is reasonable under the circumstances
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      for the Department and SPE to draw.
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                               Madam Chair, Board Member
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                  MR. DAVID:
     Tweeten. My only response is that the record before the Board shows that the only statement about the gate roads that is part of the permit is
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      that the gate roads are designed to collapse.
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      That was the statement of the mining engineer that
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      was included in the original permit that is part
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      of -- that was introduced into evidence in this
      proceeding by DEQ.
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                  The Department understands that perhaps
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      the Board would deem some of the text used in the
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      CHIA as somewhat confusing because it does do analysis based on the possibility that the gate
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      roads would collapse. Again, that was always
      treated as an examination of a worst case
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                 I don't believe that the language in
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      the CHIA or the permit conceded the gate roads
      will not collapse with time.
     The only design consideration that is available -- Again, the design of the gate roads to collapse was part of the original permit, was
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      also an element of the original permit that was
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      relied upon, or at least it was noted by the
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      Bureau of Land Management when it did its EA.
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      It's something also that DEQ argued in its -- not
      argued, but presented to the Board in its proposed
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     findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order.

I would, if you permit me, just make a suggestion. Perhaps we've kind of gotten wrapped around the axle on whether or not there is facts
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      in dispute or not. If Board's Legal Counsel will
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      permit me, I guess DEQ would suggest the Board has
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      two ways to go here.
                               The Board can remand the
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      permit to DEQ to resolve any inconsistencies that
      it believes exist in the language of the CHIA, or
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      it could continue this hearing, and give the
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      parties an opportunity to present evidence to
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      resolve those inconsistencies.
                  MR. TWEETEN: In other words, Counsel,
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      we would deny both motions for summary judgment,
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      and remand it to the Hearing Examiner for a
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      heari ng.
                  MR. DAVID: Yes, Your Honor.
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                  CHAIRMAN MILES: Is there questions for
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      the Department? I would like to give the other
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      parties -
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                  MS. REINHART-LEVINE:
                                           I would like to
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      hear from MEIC now.
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MR. HERNANDEZ: Madam Chair, Ms. Page 16

Mr. Hernandez.

CHAIRMAN MILES:

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Reinhart-Levine, to respond to your questions, the first question was about mitigation, and the adequacy of mitigation here. In our proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in Paragraph 133, cited by my esteemed opposing Counsel, and as well as our findings of fact portion in paragraph I believe it is 15, we cite this attachment to the groundwater model which was included in the record. included in the record. It was before DEQ and the whole Board all along.

We cite this portion where the groundwater hydrologist discusses the possibility of mitigation, and says there is this deep water, this deep aquifer in these channel sandstones. It has good quality water, but we're not certain if

there is enough water to mitigate. That statement is really filled out in that attachment. That's why I include it in there.

But it was included in our briefs repeatedly, and was presented before the Board by citation to other places in both the groundwater model, and in the Probable Hydrologic Consequences analysis, PHC, that we talked about so much, both of which say there is a big question about whether or not the deep underburden aquifer has sufficient water to mitigate all potential impacts from the mine. We cited that in both of our briefs, and is also cited in our proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law at Paragraph 36.

In the Probable Hydrologic Consequences report, we quote in Paragraph 36 that, "If this aquifer," meaning the deep underburden aquifer, "is to be used to serve the existing uses, and also serve potentially as a mitigation source, a better understanding of its overall capacity to meet existing and potential future demands is necessary."

So there Signal Peak Energy itself was saying, "We are not certain that this deep underburden aquifer has the capacity to meet all

mitigation needs." They said it again also in -they actually said this numerous times, and was repeated no less than three times in the Probable Hydrologic Consequences report, which was cited in our briefs, and which DEQ certainly read.

They cite elsewhere in the -- also cited in Paragraph 36 of our proposed findings that, "While the evidence to date suggests that the deeper underburden aquifer has the characteristics to meet existing demands, what is not so clear is does that aquifer have the capacity to provide full scale mitigation water for wetlands and stream reaches." That's in the PHC at 314-5-35.

A few pages later in the Probable Hydrologic Consequences, again, "If significant mitigation flow from the underburden either evolves or becomes necessary, additional

hydrologic evaluation will be necessary to ensure that existing groundwater users dependent upon the deeper underburden are not adversely affected."

They're saying there is a deep underburden, and

22 people are already using it. 23 We need to evaluat

We need to evaluate the capacity of this channel sandstone to see whether or not it has enough additional water to supply waters that will

be affected by this proposed mine. The Probable Hydrologic Consequences was entirely uncertain about whether or not mitigation exists. That was the record before the agency at the time of this decision. That was cited in our briefs. The Board and DEQ had the opportunity to review it.

In fact, we cited this additional portion farther in the groundwater model that further fleshed out the additional concerns. Not only are there questions about what is the capacity of the water, but the groundwater model has this addendum that says, "We're not sure it's even legal to use this groundwater deep underburden aquifer to discharge water onto the ground to replace stream segments." That's a big question about the legality of it. So that was just an additional reason that mitigation was far from certain here.

DEQ cites a subsequent permit revision, something that happened after they approved this mine expansion. There was a subsequent revision where they did additional analysis, and that analysis reached additional conclusions. They are not before the Board right now. I've read them, the federal government has read them, and I can

say that there is significant uncertainty remaining about that, but that's not before the Board.

If the matter is remanded to the agency, the expansion is vacated, DEQ will be able to use that information, Signal Energy will be able to use that information, and they can make a fuller assessment of the availability of mitigation water from the deep underburden aquifer.

But as Board Member Tweeten -- the appropriate way to deal with additional evidence would be for the agency to incorporate it in its subsequent analysis of the application on remand after the permit is vacated.

Now, the question about Class 2/Class 3 groundwater, that's the big issue before the Board. The agency has said that the water, the gob water in the mine area will degrade from Class 2 to Class 3 groundwater, and that will change the designated uses of that water. The big question is whether or not that polluted gob water will migrate.

Here we have to recall that the governing statute says that the applicant and the agency have to affirmatively demonstrate that the

mine is designed to prevent material damage beyond the permit boundary, so they have the burden to show, present evidence, that affirmatively demonstrates in some positive manner, with some degree of confidence, that this pollution is not going to move beyond the mine permit boundary.

My esteemed colleague here, he pointed to two things that he says shows that the water is not going to move beyond the mine permit boundary. He said there is certainty that the gate roads will collapse. He cites this letter from the mining engineers from 1995, that was then updated apparently in 2006, that said, "Generally the way that the gate roads are designed is that you mine them, they're there, and as you move on, they collapse." The CHIA also says that the gate roads are designed to collapse.

But in the analysis of material damage in the CHIA, and in the Probable Hydrologic Consequences report, neither DEQ nor Signal Peak Energy relies on the certain collapse of the gate roads to conclude that the water won't move beyond the mine permit boundary.

Recall that two scenarios that were presented in the groundwater model said that if

they don't collapse, the water is going to -- the gob water is going to move farther faster. Now, neither the PHC nor the CHIA said they're surely going to collapse, so the water is not going to move. They were entirely uncertain. We cite in our proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law multiple places where both Signal Peak Energy and DEQ say they may or they may not collapse. They repeat it over and over.

There's not one statement in the determinative analysis, the PHC or the CHIA, that says that these are going to collapse. There is complete uncertainty. And the reason for that is that the gate roads had not collapsed. In both the groundwater model, the Probable Hydrologic Consequences -- the PHC-- and in the CHIA, they note that at present, the gate roads have not col I apsed.

So the prediction from this engineer, it hadn't played out, and it seems to be that that is the reason that neither the PCC nor the CHIA rely on prompt collapse of the gate roads to reach their conclusions. They didn't because the gate roads have not collapsed. It would be -- I posit that it would be entirely unreasonable, arbitrary

and capricious if you will, to rely on a report, a prediction that evidence has proved not to be the case. The gate roads have not yet collapsed, and that is why neither the PHC or the CHIA relied on

CHAIRMAN MILES: These are gate roads from the previous mining activity that you're referring to?

MR. HERNANDEZ: Yes, that's right. There is an ongoing mining operation. So in their analysis, they say the gate roads haven't collapsed, and because of that, it seems to me neither the PHC nor the CHIA relies on prompt collapse of the gate roads. In fact, instead they have two scenarios, scenario one where they do collapse, scenario two where they don't.

As Board Member Tweeten pointed out Page 19

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101615_BER2013-07SM earlier, it's the CHIA analysis and the PHC 19 analysis that we must rely on, the four corners of 20 those documents. Nowhere does the CHIA say all 21 the gate roads are going to promptly collapse, and therefore the polluted gob water is not going to migrate and not cause degradation of the Class 2 22 23 groundwaters outside the permit boundary to Class 3. They don't make that analysis. They say it 24 25 0047 may or may not collapse. That's what they determine, and it is 2 simply not enough, we argue, to say material damage may or may not occur. That's not the damage may or may not occur. standard. They have to show that material damage will not occur, and that's in the regulations 17.24.406(5) I believe, or 405(6). There has to 5 6 7 be some affirmative conclusion that they're not 8 9 going to trash the water outside the permit 10 boundary. _May or may not isn't enough. The second point that my esteemed 11 colleague made was with respect to the fifty year 12 time horizon. He said first, all of the gate roads are affirmatively going to collapse. That's not warranted. And then he says therefore it is 13 14 15 not -- the gob water is not going to migrate. 16 he forgets to add the asterisk that's in all of 17 this that says for fifty years. Even if all of the gate roads collapse 18 19 -- this is scenario one -- they all collapse, the 20 groundwater model, and the PHC, and the CHIA all say, well, then degradation of groundwater outside the mine permit boundary from Class 2 to Class 3 will not happen for fifty years, and that's an arbitrary fifty year time horizon that they've 21 22 23 24 25 0048 used. There's nothing that addresses this beyond 2 3 fifty years. So that is the big question at the end 4 5 of the day, Board Member Reinhart-Levine, is there is not an affirmative showing in the PHC or the CHIA about what's going to become of this groundwater beyond the mine permit boundary. 6 7 There's one scenario in which the gate roads do 8 9 not collapse, as they have not collapsed. 10 that this water is going to move beyond the mine permit boundary, and that is a big problem. 11 haven't shown that that's not going to happen. 12 As we say in our proposed findings, they've said that material damage to the 13 14 15 hydrologic balance outside the permit boundary may or may not happen, and there may or may not be 16 mitigation water to mitigate the impacts if it 17 So that doesn't satisfy the standard of the 18 19 Montana Surface and Underground Mining Act, it 20 doesn't satisfy the CHIA provision. 21 If the Board has any other questions, I'd be happy to answer them. Otherwise I'll sidown. Thank you for your time.

MR. WADE: Madam Chair, I know it was 22 Otherwise I'll sit 23 24 asked for the Department and MEIC to speak, but 25 0049

we're here on behalf of Signal Peak Energy. And we don't want to rehash the discussions that have Page 20

been going on, the discussions amongst the Board members, or the arguments between Mr. David and Mr. Hernandez.

What I think we'd like to point out is the discussion in some ways reflects that maybe there isn't an agreement on the facts, and that if there isn't an agreement on the facts, that that warrants some evidentiary type of hearing. And I say that not because we want to prolong this. We'd like to move along.

But as you heard before, the Department has undertaken an analysis, and it is in the record. It may not be within the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, but you have to look at the entire record. We do our best to try to parse those items out, and I think that a view of the various submittals shows that there is some disagreement on what people's take away from the record is.

Our take away is the Department has some expertise, some technical expertise and background in this, and they're allowed to make decisions. Nowhere in this record are you going to see any

contradictory expert opinion or evidence that calls into question the Department's findings. What you see are some statements and allegations of folks who don't necessarily agree with the Department, but the Department is the permitting entity, they're allowed to make the decision, and we think we should be able to move forward under the permit. We think we should be entitled to summary judgment, or at a minimum, we should have an evidentiary hearing to flesh these issues out. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN MILES: Thank you. Any further questions? What's the pleasure of the Board at this point?

MR. TWEETEN: Madam Chair, if I may, I think Mr. Wade makes an interesting point, and one that we ought to consider.

It seems to me that if we vacate the permit and remand to DEQ, that puts the parties back at square one. As the record stands right now, the parties have all stipulated that they're satisfied with the administrative hearing record, and don't take exception to any of the facts that are shown by all of the materials that are in the record.

As I said in July, I'm a little uneasy about that as to whether it satisfies the requirement of Rule 56, but having given the matter considerable thought, I think I'm satisfied, and if the parties want us to rule on the question of whether summary judgment ought to be entered on the existing record, I think we can do that.

If we decide to vacate and remand, the parties are back at square one, and DEQ would then be required to review the existing record and then decide what to do from there.

And if it chose to, I suppose DEQ at

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that point could simply reissue the permit, and 15 put the ball in MEIC's court to decide what to do, and MEIC then would undoubtedly appeal from that decision; and at that point, if the parties don't feel like they want to stipulate as to what's in 16 17 18 19 the administrative record, it would go to a 20 factual hearing in front of a Hearing Examiner and would come to us with proposed findings and 21 22 conclusions from the Hearing Examiner, which 23 frankly would make me a lot more comfortable than what we're presented with right now. 24 25 On the other hand, DEQ could decide that

they need to study the matter further, and conduct additional investigations based on the objections that MEIC has brought forward, as well as other objections, if there are any, or other ideas or concepts that DEQ has about things that need to be further fleshed out, and then rule on the permit one way or the other, and let the parties decide at that point, depending on who is aggrieved by the ultimate decision the Department makes, what's going to happen next; either the permit will be denied, in which case SPE will in all likelihood demand an administrative hearing, or if the permit is granted, then MEIC would.

But in either case, I don't think the parties are bound by the stipulation that they've made to agree with what's in the record, and no other facts be considered should we vacate and

remand.

So I've taken the liberty of scribbling some things down here, and they're going to be illegible to anybody by me, I think. They might be illegible to me, too, for that matter. I'm not going to move this, but I'm going to put it on the table for consideration by the Board, and if it appears that it is a road to

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get us past this particular step in the process in the judgment of the Board, then I would make it in the form of a motion.

But what I would suggest is that the Board grant partial summary judgment in favor of MEIC, and against DEQ and SPE, and deny SPE's motion for summary judgment on the grounds, first of all, that the CHIA is based on a fifty year time horizon for evaluating migration of groundwater from the mine site, and the Board finds that there is no legal authority for limiting the consideration of material damage outside the permitting area to effects that occur within fifty years of the cessation of mining; and since the best case scenario in the record on which the Department relied, in which the gate roads collapse and limit groundwater migration, the effects are only considered in the modeling up to fifty years, but not beyond, basing the grant of a permit on such a time limited analysis is error and requires that the permit be vacated. that would be the first grounds.

Then second, the second ground that I would suggest would be that DEQ performed

insufficient legal analysis of the role of 0054

mitigation water in preventing material damage

outside the permit area.

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First, in my view anyway, the evidence does not support the assumption that mitigation waters from deep aquifers will prevent or assist in preventing material damage outside of the permit area for the reasons that are argued in MEIC's proposed findings and conclusions, that there are substantial qualifications in the material in the record with respect to the likelihood that that mitigation will actually happen, using, relying on these deep groundwater aqui fers.

And second, that the use of the term "prevent" in the statute raises serious questions as to whether mitigation plays a role in analyzing whether the project is designed to prevent material damage at all.

So that would be my idea, and I'd love to hear what the rest of the Board thinks about that as a remand.

CHAIRMAN MILES: Would you clarify a little bit about the concept of partial summary judgment.

MR. TWEETEN: Rule 56 of the Rules of

Civil Procedure allows for the filing of summary judgment motions, and a summary judgment motion asks the Court to enter a final judgment in the matter on the grounds that there is no factual dispute -- the only arguments are about questions of law which are submitted to the Court for decision -- and that there is a basis in the existing record for entry of a final judgment in

favor of one party against the other.

So we have two of those motions in front of us, one from MEIC and one from SPE. The Court is not obligated to either grant or deny summary judgment on the whole case. There is also an option for the Court to enter what's called partial summary judgment, in which a party is granted some relief with respect to those matters on which there aren't any factual issues, but the Court does not issue a judgment on the entire case.

So I guess as we discuss it, I'm not entirely sure that partial summary judgment is the right standard here, but --

CHAIRMAN MILES: Does that vacate the permit?

MR. TWEETEN: Partial summary judgment

ordinarily wouldn't vacate, so I think partial probably shouldn't be in there, because you would be granting summary judgment, in that the Board's ruling would vacate the existing permit, which is the relief MEIC has asked for in their motion. So it probably shouldn't be partial summary judgment, it should just be summary judgment.

And we would grant MEIC's summary judgment on the following grounds, and then deny Page 23

101615_BER2013-07SM SPE's motion for summary judgment. Since the Department hasn't moved for summary judgment, 10 11 12 there is nothing to grant them, but they are nonetheless going to be bound by the vacate or remand as a party to the case.

CHAIRMAN MILES: Thank you. 13 14 15 MR. TWEETEN: So that would be my 16 Again, I'll fish around for whether 17 thought. 18 there are any other particular errors or questions 19 that the Board would want to include in the 20 grounds for vacating the remand decision, because 21 as I said, I think we owe it to the parties to be 22 as comprehensive as we can at this point. CHAIRMAN MILES: Board members comments? MR. O'CONNOR: I would agree with your 23 24 25 position on this, that we grant summary judgment 0057 1 to MEIC for the reasons you specified. 2 DR. BYRON: As would I. 3 CHAIRMAN MILES: Michelle, do you have 4 any comments? 5 MS. REINHART-LEVINE: Madam Chair, Mr. Tweeten, I agree with the reasons that you set forth. I would I guess add that I would support 6 7 summary judgment for MEIC regarding findings just 8 9 general I y. I would not limit it to just the one 10 and two that you put forth, but would grant the additional findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth by MEIC for their summary judgment, 11 12 because I agree that DEQ probably employed the 13 incorrect material damage standard here for some 14 of the reasons that you set forth, but I think that that's the overarching flaw. 15 16 I commend all parties involved for very 17 detailed findings of fact and conclusions, and 18 19 very detailed briefing, and very well argued; but at the end of the day, I do think that the 20 21 incorrect standards for material damage have been 22 applied under the statute. MR. TWEETEN: Max 23 Madam Chair. Michelle, would you want the Board to grant summary judgment and adopt MEIC's proposal findings and conclusions 24 25 0058 in total? Is that the suggestion? 1 MS. REINHART-LEVINE: Madam Chair, Mr. 3 I think for the sake of simplicity, as 4 well as for Mr. Reed's benefit, who would otherwise have to cherry pick which findings and which conclusions, is that that's the simplest way 5 6 7 to proceed at this moment in time. DR. BYRON: Madam Chair, I would agree with Michelle that the points Mr. Tweeten has made 8 9 10 certainly deserve emphasis, but that we are also obligated to address all of the issues that both 11 sides have put forth if we grant summary judgment. So we still have to address those other issues, 12 13 but I agree these need to be emphasized.

CHAIRMAN MILES: Procedurally then, I'm hearing consensus at least conceptually on your 14 15 16 17 motion and your proposal. I guess I go back to what I said earlier. Do we need to close the 18 19 hearing and determine that this is submitted for 20 final decision? I need to ask Ben.

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                    MR. REED: Madam Chair, procedurally,
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      yes.
               Once the hearing is closed, then I think the
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      motion to grant summary judgment would be at that
      point appropriate.

MR. TWEETEN: Madam Chair, I so move to
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      close the hearing.
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                    MR. O' ČONNOR:
                                         Second.
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                    CHAIRMAN MILES:
                                            Any discussion?
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                     (No response)
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                    CHAIRMAN MILÉS:
                                            All in favor, please
      say aye.
                     (Response)
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                    CHAIRMAN MILES:
                                            Opposed.
                     (No response)
                    CHAIRMAN MILÉS:
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                                            None.
                                                     The hearing is
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      cl osed.
                   The matter is submitted for final
                      Would you like to put your
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      recommendation in the form of a motion? We have
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      it all on the record.
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                    MR. TWEETEN:
                                       Madam Chair, if I might.
      Respectfully -- and I understand the point that Michelle makes -- but I am most comfortable basing
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      the remand on these specific points. I'm not at
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      this stage prepared to agree with everything that
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      MEIC has argued in their proposed findings and conclusions. So if it is the judgment of a
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      majority of the Board to go that way, I think I
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      would want to register a concurring vote, in which
      I'd agree in the Board's judgment to vacate and remand, but nonetheless limit the grounds for the
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      vacate and remand to the ones that I've specified.
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                    I don't think it affects what the
      majority of the Board has done, but I'd like to be on the record as saying that I'm most comfortable with the approach I've suggested; not that I have
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      to have my way, or I'm going to fold up and go
      home, but I just feel more comfortable in being more specific in terms of the grounds on which the
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      Board should rely on sending this back.

CHAIRMAN MILES: The implications of
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      that are to -- I think actually what Michelle was
      getting at -- then do we go through the findings and conclusions in their proposal?
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      MR. TWEETEN: Madam Chair, as I suggested and in the questions that I asked
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      Michelle, as I understand her proposal, it is that the Board grant summary judgment in favor of MEIC, and adopt their proposed findings and conclusions as presented, and I'm not comfortable agreeing to
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      that.
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                    CHAIRMAN MILES:
                                            Your proposal is to
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       grant summary judgment and remand to the
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      Department?
      MR. TWEETEN: Right, and I think Michelle's proposing a remand to the Department as
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      well, are you not?
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                    MS. REINHART-LEVINE: Madam Chair, Mr.
                    Yes, I would also propose that. And if
      we only granted partial summary judgment on the items that you specified, then I think what would
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happen is the parties would basically continue on with the proceedings, and the other items, which I think while there may be agreement about what is in the record, I do agree with Mr. Wade that there is substantial disagreement on the interpretation of the facts.

 $\,$ And so I think that your recommendation is the prudent way to proceed, and at least we have agreement amongst those of us present on those areas that you've mentioned.

CHAIRMAN MILES: But I don't think it

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was a partial summary judgment. MR. TWEETEN: No, it No, it is a full summary judgment, because we're granting the relief that they're asking for. We're going to vacate and remand, and it is not partial. But the grounds are important, I think, in terms of explaining to the parties what we're troubled by, and that's why I'm more comfortable having more limited grounds as opposed to simply adopting MEIC's proposed

findings and conclusions in their totality.

So that's my position, and I don't mean to impugn the action of a majority of the Board by any stretch. If it's the Board's judgment to go the way that Michelle has suggested, that is certainly a legitimate thing for the Board to do. If I want to take a separate view as to how I think the matter ought to come out, it's not going to undercut what the Board has done, and certainly if we have a majority vote of the Board, and the Board acts by majority vote, so -CHAIRMAN MILES: So just getting back to

that, I think we've raised some other issues that would be -- should you move your proposal -- that should be added to yours. But my question is if the motion passes, do we ask Ben to write an order

since we're not adopting any of the others?

MR. TWEETEN: Yes, Ben will have to do
that. By adopting MEIC's proposals as advanced by MEIC in their proposed findings and conclusions, we've made his job easier, because those become the Board's findings and conclusions, and all he will have to do then is tackle the question of what to do with the ones that were submitted by the Department and by SPE. So we've basically

taken a third of your job away at that point, and left you with the hardest part to complete. But at least it's something, I think. the way you would see it as well? Ben, is that

MR. REED: I believe so. The more that the Board -- The statute requires that if a party submits proposed findings of fact, that the decision must include a ruling on each proposed So if the Board adopts MEIC's findings and conclusions in toto, then that does cut out a significant portion of the labor; but respectfully speaking, Madam Chair, I don't think that should have a bearing on the Board's decision.

CHAIRMAN MILES: My question more went to Mr. Tweeten's motion, which would not adopt MEIC's proposed findings of fact and conclusions

of law. What do we -- vis-a-vis you -- need to draft as a final order?

MR. REED: Madam Chair, once Mr. Tweeten makes his motion, then the order would be put together by developing findings of fact that either adopt or make some other ruling on each and every one of the parties that is not covered by Mr. Tweeten's motion, or positing that Mr. Tweeten makes a motion and no one else does.

Once that happens, the findings of fact will be added, or adopted, or otherwise ruled on, and the conclusions of law will be adopted, and an order that simply and clearly states what the motion was will then be sort of embraced as a matter of law at the end. I would, in drafting that, as a mechanical matter, take that from the transcript to assure clarity, and circulate it among the members of the Board, along with the necessary transcript portions, so that the Board could be sure that what was coming off of my desk was in fact what the Board had in mind.

Now the Board has, as I indicated previously, ninety days to make a ruling on the matter, to formally adopt its findings of fact and conclusions of law and order, with an additional thirty days if necessary. So if at the end of whatever period the Board selects, the Board is still unhappy with the state of the findings of fact and conclusions of law and order, the Board can have a total of 120 days to worry about making sure that everything is in apple pie order.

MR. TWEETEN: We'd have to adopt the

motion to extend the deadline for thirty days, and state the good cause on the record, but we could

do that. Sure.

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 CHAIRMAN MILES: So if you do proceed to put your proposal into the form of a motion, and it passes, then do we need to address reasons for not accepting the other findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the Department and Signal Peak?

MR. TWEETEN: Madam Chair, if I might. First of all, I would suggest that Michelle make her motion first, because if it gathers a majority of the Board's votes, then it is clear that those become the findings and conclusions of the Board, and the only thing Ben will need to do then is to deal with the others that are proposed by the other parties.

And in my experience at least, the best way to do that, as I said before, is to group them together, and go through the proposals by the other parties. And I think Ben is best equipped to do that, and come back to the Board with a proposal as to how to deal with the other parties' proposed findings and conclusions, whether the conclusions are erroneous as a matter of law, whether the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence, or irrelevant, or whatever grounds.

I'd leave it to Ben's judgment to at Page 27

101615_BER2013-07SM least initially propose how those ought to be 3 dealt with, rather than have all of us go through 4 them one at a time, and discuss each one 5 individually. I think if Ben presents us with a discussion draft that we can look at, and then at our next meeting perhaps, or after the ninety days has run, we can decide on a final judgment.

CHAIRMAN MILES: Is there a motion from 6 7 8 9 the Board? 10 MS. REINHART-LEVINE: Madam Chair, just 11 a quick clarification. Mr. Reed, does that 12 basically satisfy our obligations under Montana 13 Code Annotated 2-4-623 requiring the Board to rule on each proposed findings of fact, to basically have you make those recommendations for us, and 14 15 16 then we can basically adopt what you -- or review and adopt as we see fit what you present? 17 18 19 MR. REED: Madam Chair, Board Member Reinhart-Levine, I think it does, yes. If I follow Mr. Tweeten's sage advice, I think that 20 21 will be exactly what the law had in mind. 22 MS. ŘEINHART-LEVINE: Madam Chair, Mr. 23 Reed. If we only granted partial summary judgment, how would the rest of the case proceed? 24 25 0067 MR. REED: Madam Chair, Board Member Reinhart-Levine. "It depends" is a deeply unsatisfactory answer, I know, but I think that if 1 2 3 4 the partial summary judgment about which Mr. Tweeten was speaking were granted, it would still have the effect of vacating, functionally vacating the Department's permit or approval of the permit. So I don't think that at the end of the day there 5 6 7 8 9 would be a significant difference between the two. 10 MS. REINHART-LEVINE: Madam Chair, I 11 would like to make a motion that the Board grant MEIC's motion for summary judgment, and deny SPE's cross motion for summary judgment; and then I would further move that DEQ's cumulative 12 13 14 hydrologic impact assessment accompanying its approval of SPE's permit amendment be vacated and 15 16 set aside; and incorporated therein, I would 17 18 recommend the Board remand this matter to DEQ for 19 further proceedings consistent with the Board's 20 deci si on. 21 CHAIRMAN MILES: Is there a second? MR. SAYLES O' CONNOR: 22 I'll second it. 23 CHAIRMAN MILES: Further discussion? 24 (No response) 25 CHAIRMAN MILÉS: All in favor of the 0068 1 motion, please say aye. 2 3 4 (Response) CHAIRMAN MILES: Opposed. MR. TWEETEN: No. CHAIRMAN MILES: 5 Thank you for 6 7 explaining that. Motion carries. MR. TWEETEN: Just for purposes of the record, Madam Chair, I will be preparing a brief concurring statement on my own behalf, explaining 8 9 10 that while I agree with the Board's judgment vacating remand, my reasoning would be somewhat 11 12 di fferent.

101615_BER2013-07SM 13 CHAIRMAN MILES: Thank you. 14 MS. REINHART-LEVINE: Madam Chair, members of the Board. For the sake of clarity, I move that the Board adopt MEIC's findings of fact 15 16 17 and conclusions of law. CHAIRMAN MILES: 18 Is that necessary, that 19 motion? 20 MR. REED: It would certainly clear up 21 the record. CHAIRMAN MILES: Is there a second to 22 23 that motion? Second. 24 DR. BYRON: 25 CHAIRMAN MILES: Seconded by Dr. Byron. 0069 I would just make one quick note. Believe me this is going to sound silly. I did see a typo in MEIC's proposed findings. It just jumped out me. 2 3 4 It is on Page 4. You might want to just make a 5 note of that. 6 It is on Page 4, Paragraph 9. It states 7 that, "On October 5th, 2015, Signal Peak Energy submitted a permit amendment." That should be 8 That should be 2012. I certainly didn't read all of these to the extent that I would notice any other typos, but I 9 10 11 did notice that one, so that needs to be 12 corrected. 13 Is there any further discussion about 14 adopting the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law with that correction? 15 (No response) 16 CHAIRMAN MILÉS: 17 Seeing none, all in 18 favor, please say aye. 19 (Response) CHAIRMAN MILES: Opposed? 20 21 MR. TWEETEN: No. 22 CHAIRMAN MILES: Motion passes, motion 23 carries, and you will prepare for the record a 24 concurring --MR. TWEETEN: 25 Certainly, and I'll 0070 circulate that to the members of the Board, of 1 2 course. 3 CHAIRMAN MILES: I think that item of 4 business is completed. 5 (The proceedings were concluded 6 7 at 1: 15 p.m.) 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

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             STATE OF MONTANA
           : SS.

COUNTY OF LEWIS & CLARK

I, LAURIE CRUTCHER, RPR, Court Reporter,

Notary Public in and for the County of Lewis &

Clark, State of Montana, do hereby certify:

That the proceedings were taken before me at
the time and place herein named; that the
proceedings were reported by me in shorthand and
transcribed using computer-aided transcription,
and that the foregoing - 70 - pages contain a true
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ability.
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            ability.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
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18
                                                              LAURIE CRUTCHER, RPR
Court Reporter - Notary Public
My commission expires
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